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Abstract This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative
games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transpar-
ent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each
other’s strategies in all possible worlds, which together we refer to as Perfect
Prediction. The anticipation of a player’s decision by their opponents is coun-
terfactually dependent on the decision, unlike in Nash Equilibra where the
decisions are made independently. The equilibrium, when it exists, is unique
and is Pareto optimal.
This equilibrium is the normal-form counterpart of the Perfect Prediction
Equilibrium; the prediction happens “in another room” rather than in the
past. The equilibrium can also be seen as a natural extension of Hofstadter’s
superrationality to non-symmetric games.
Algorithmically, an iterated elimination of non-individually-rational strat-
egy profiles is performed until at most one remains. An equilibrium is a strat-
egy profile that is immune against knowledge of strategies in all possible worlds
and rationality in all possible worlds, a stronger concept than common knowl-
edge of rationality but also than common counterfactual belief of rationality.
We formalize and contrast the Non-Nashian Decision Theory paradigm,
common to this and several other papers, with Causal Decision Theory and
Evidential Decision Theory. We define the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium
algorithmically and, when it exists, prove its uniqueness, its Pareto-optimality,
and that it coincides with the Hofstadter’s Superrationality on symmetric
games.
We also relate to concepts found in literature such as Individual Rational-
ity, Rationalizability, Minimax-Rationalizability, Second-Order Nash Equilib-
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ria, the Program Equilibrium, the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium, Shiffrin’s
Joint-Selfish-Rational Equilibrium, the Stalnaker-Bonanno Equilibrium, the
Perfect Cooperation Equilibrium and the Translucent Equilibrium, the Corre-
lated Equilibrium and Quantum Games.
Finally, we specifically discuss inclusion relationships on the special case of
symmetric games between Individual Rationality, Minimax-Rationalizability,
Superrationality and the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium, and contrast them
with asymmetric games.
Keywords Counterfactual dependency, Necessary Rationality, Necessary
Knowledge of Strategies, Perfect Prediction, Transparency, Non-Cooperative
Game Theory, Non-Nashian Game Theory, Strategic Games, Superrationality
1 Introduction
1.1 Superrational thinking
On the planet Betazed, a member of the United Federation of Planets, people
have telepathic powers (Roddenberry, 1969). The prisoner’s dilemma is not
one to Betazoids: they cooperate, as it is quite obvious to them. They can
read each other’s minds, which leads to strong dependencies between their de-
cisions. The assumption underlying the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951), namely
that the opponent’s strategy is kept frozen and fixed while optimizing one’s
payoff, does not apply to them: indeed, any change of strategy leads to an
instantaneous change of strategy of the opponent. Defect, and the opponent
defects. Cooperate, and they cooperate as well.
While this scenario pertains to twenty-fourth-century science fiction, the
progress made in data science, large scale data analysis as well as machine
learning in the last decade hints that the decisions of human beings, especially
at large scales, can be predicted to some extent, and that extent increases every
year. This observation shakes a fundamental axiom of neoclassical economics,
namely, that agents make decisions independently of each other. This axiom,
which some refer to as free choice1, is also at the core of Nashian2 game theory
and in particular of the Nash equilibrium.
Hofstadter (1983) suggested an alternate line of reasoning, which he called
superrationality, and which we introduce formally in Section 8.2. The main idea
behind superrationality is that the players have such a high level of awareness
of their rationality, and of their common knowledge thereof, and of their own
reasonings, that they are able to reason on a meta-level, taking into account
1 We consider this mainstream approach to free choice a strong definition of free choice.
There are other, weaker definitions of free choice that are compatible with being predictable,
for example, that one “could have acted otherwise”. This latter approach is taken in this
paper.
2 Throughout this paper, we use the adjective “Nashian” to refer to the Nash paradigm.
Also usage of the term Non-Nashian should be seen as a tribute to the work by John Nash,
similar to what we call Non-Euclidian Geometry as a reference to Euclid.
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Defect Cooperate
Defect 1, 1 3, 0
Cooperate 0, 3 2, 2
Fig. 1 The prisoner’s dilemma. Superrational players either both cooperate or both deviate.
In a Hofstadter equilibrium, players both cooperate.
that the opponent’s is reasoning in the exact same way. In Douglas Hofstadter’s
words:
“If reasoning dictates an answer, then everyone should independently
come to that answer. Seeing this fact is itself the critical step in the
reasoning toward the correct answer [...]. Once you realize this fact,
then it dawns on you that either all rational players will choose D or
all rational players will choose C. This is the crux.
Any number of ideal rational thinkers faced with the same situation and
undergoing similar throes of reasoning agony will necessarily come up
with the identical answer eventually, so long as reasoning alone is the
ultimate justification for their conclusion. Otherwise reasoning would
be subjective, not objective as arithmetics is. A conclusion reached by
reasoning would be a matter of preference, not of necessity.”
Douglas Hofstadter gave a concrete algorithm for superrational play that is
specific to only symmetric games in normal form. Superrational thinkers start
with the assumption that there is only one rational strategy, and use their
logical skills to find it. Because the game is symmetric, the rational strategies
must be identical on both sides, so that the final outcome will necessary be
on the diagonal. Knowing this, it is straightforward that the reasonable course
of action is, for both players, to pick that strategy that leads to the optimal
strategy profile on the diagonal (Figure 17). This is the one rational strategy,
confirming the initial assumption.
It is crucial to understand that the interdependency of the decisions that
leads to both players cooperating in the prisoner’s dilemma is not built on any
supernatural telepathic powers: it is solely based on the simultaneous use of
the same mathematical and logical laws on the same shared set of assumptions.
1.2 Going beyond symmetric games
The goal of this paper is to extend superrational reasoning to all games in
normal form, with the only restriction that there are no ties in the payoffs,
that is, players are never indifferent between any two outcomes. 3. In practice,
games with ties can be turned into games without ties by adding a small noise
on the payoffs.
3 also called general positions in literature
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The generalized equilibrium is called the Perfectly Transparent Equilib-
rium, and we will show that, while it does not always exist, it is always unique,
is always Pareto-optimal, and coincides with Hofstadter’s equilibrium on sym-
metric games.
Two concepts are introduced in the reasoning underlying the Perfectly
Transparent Equilibrium: Necessary Rationality, i.e., rationality in all possible
worlds, on the one hand, and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies, i.e., the
agents correctly predict each other in all possible worlds, on the other hand.
The Nashian hypothesis that deviations of strategies are unilateral, however,
is dropped.
Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies thus provide
a more generic and fine-grained epistemic support for superrationality (Section
8.2) than its original characterization by Hofstadter as a direct maximization
of payoffs on the diagonal. These concepts were first described in philosophical
papers (Dupuy, 1992) (Dupuy, 2000)4 and applied to games in extensive form
with perfect information by Fourny et al (2018). However, we assume that the
reader did not read these papers and explain these concepts in detail in this
paper.
We will finish the paper with examples, counter-examples, a review of non-
Nashian literature as well as a few inclusion theorems on the specific case of
symmetric games that connect the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium (Nec-
essary Rationality), Hofstadter’s equilibrium (Superrationality) (Hofstadter,
1983), Halpern’s and Pass’s minimax rationalizability (Common Counterfac-
tual Belief of Rationality) (Halpern and Pass, 2018), as well as individual
rationality as found in the commonly known folk theorems.
1.3 Motivation and practical use
The two concepts of Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strate-
gies can be seen as strong assumptions. In practice, however, these assumptions
can be reduced to the agents’ believing that they are rational in all possible
worlds and correctly predict each other in all possible worlds, as pointed out
by Dupuy (2000). Whether or not these beliefs are actually correct is irrelevant
and the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium is reached even with this weaker
assumption: in the end, the decisions made by agents are driven by their own
beliefs and rational reasoning under these beliefs.
Having this in mind, we see six relevant domains of applicability of the
Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium:
1.3.1 Philosophy of ethics
First, on some situations including the prisoner’s dilemma, the behavior pre-
dicted by the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium, e.g., cooperating, is actually
4 Dupuy uses the term “essential prediction.”
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encountered in the real world for some agents. The belief in Necessary Ratio-
nality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies can be seen as a formal model
for describing honest behavior: somebody who holds the sincere belief that
they are an open book and that everybody else correctly anticipates all their
actions is less likely to choose to betray other agents – regardless of whether
this belief is correct or not.
In turn, and as a consequence, Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowl-
edge of Strategies can also provide a prescriptive framework that helps defin-
ing ethical behavior. Dupuy’s work is largely inspired by Kantian philosophy,
where acting based on this belief can be packaged as a categorical imperative
to do so.
For games in extensive form (Fourny et al, 2018), this Kantian imperative
seeks to avoid inconsistencies and seek a consistent timeline where the pre-
diction of the solution of the game causes that solution to be reached, as a
self-fulfilling prophecy. In Dupuy’s words, “never act in such a way that, had
your action been anticipated, it would not be in their power to carry it out.“
1.3.2 Bargaining
Nashian agents that would, under the classical Nash reasoning, reach a Nash
equilibrium that is sub-optimal, such as both betraying in the prisoner’s dilemma
(see also “social dilemma’ examples in Section 6.2) often realize that they are
stuck in an insatisfactory equilibrium. They can choose to enter a bargain,
and commit contractually to different choices that are otherwise inaccessible
to Nashian agents. The Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium provides a natural
basis for such a bargain: acknowledging that the shared belief in Necessary
Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies always leads to Pareto-
optimal outcomes, the agents can agree to commit to act “as if” they believed
so, and, draft the choice of strategies into a binding contract accordingly. This
is a pragmatic and practical way to find and agree on a Pareto-optimal out-
come.
1.3.3 Predicting human decisions with Machine Learning
A more long-term motivation for the Perfectly Transparent Equillibrium, and
the non-Nashian approach in general, is that Machine Learning techniques are
constantly getting better at predicting human behavior. An example thereof
is the work by Kadar et al (2015), which predicts in advance where burglaries
are most likely to happen so that the police can optimize their patrols.
Predicting human behavior, however, is different from predicting tomor-
row’s weather. Indeed, when the agents that are being predicted are informed
of the prediction (valid in one possible world) in advance, they can adapt their
behavior and make this prediction false. Any system that claims to predict
the decisions made by human beings must thus consider its own impact on
the agents it predicts, i.e., the fact that people know in advance what is be-
ing predicted that they will do. Thus, perfect prediction can only be achieved
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by considering this as a fixpoint problem, taking the implications of its own
anticipation into account.
We expect that, in the coming decades, such systems will increasingly chal-
lenge the classical, Nashian approach to game theory and push us outside of
its domain of validity.
1.3.4 Ethics of AI and robots
Leaving the domain of validity of the Nash approach to game theory may
happen at a faster pace if people start delegating some of their decisions to
AI recommendation systems (Harari, 2015) as they realize that these systems
know them better than themselves. Indeed, AI recommendation systems (e.g.,
movies on Netflix, books on Amazon, restaurants, dating websites, etc.) are
purely based on algorithms and code. If Artificial Intelligence becomes a proxy
for human decisions, the mutual strategic interactions shift from humans to
machines, and optimizing decisions in this environment becomes a purely pro-
grammatic and algorithmic problem.
In a fully transparent setup in which the machines know one another’s code
and algorithms, the non-Nashian concepts of Necessary Rationality and Nec-
essary Knowledge of Strategies become more adequate models than Nashian
rationality and unilateral deviations.
Furthermore, due to the advantageous economic properties of the Perfectly
Transparent Equilibrium as well as its extensive-form counterpart (Fourny
et al, 2018), namely, their Pareto-optimality, having programming machines
(e.g., smart contracts) that interact with each other transparently under Neces-
sary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies can lead to desirable,
Pareto-optimal outcomes in general, and to Pareto-improvements over Nash
equilibria in some (but not all) settings.
This provides an additional incentive to manage the behavior of Artificial
Intelligence systems interacting with each other so as to emulate what could
be interpreted as honest behavior, with ramification in the ethics of AI.
1.3.5 Modelling of an absent or impaired theory of mind
The belief of Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies can
be directly put into perspective with the absence or impairment of a theory of
mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) for an agent. “Theory of mind” refers to
the ability to distinguish between one’s knowledge and the knowledge of other
agents.
Even though at first sight many would argue that they are more stringent
assumptions than the simpler, Nashian assumptions of Common Knowledge of
Rationality and Common Knowledge of Strategies, it could as well be argued,
on the contrary, that these assumptions are, in fact, simpler assumptions than
in the Nash equilibrium reasoning.
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Indeed, agents in the Nash paradigm must keep track of who knows what,
who knows who knows what, etc, which requires a significant amount of re-
sources in terms of computation and memory from the brain. Higher levels of
reasoning are even inaccessible to human agents in practice.
Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies flattens the
structure of knowledge by idealizing agents as being epistemically omniscient.
This also leads to less computational complexity in our algorithms, which
is even more visible in the extensive form variant of the paradigm, which is
based on a forward induction (Fourny et al, 2018). Children with a not-yet-
developed or impaired theory of mind, for example, do not lie well or at all,
simply put, because they believe that everybody else knows what they know
(Ding et al, 2015) (Evans and Lee, 2013) (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985). The belief
of Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies can thus be
used as a descriptive model for such agents.
There is an interesting argument made by Rich Shiffrin et al (2009), who
uses a thought experiment in which an agent is playing against themselves,
but are taking Midalozam, a drug that erases short-term memory, between
making their decisions. This can also be used in games in normal form, by
having the agent make the row and column decisions in turn, knowing that
they are making both decisions, although not jointly.
The decisions made in such a setup still remain strategic decisions, making
this process non-trivial.
1.3.6 Deterministic extension of quantum theory
Another promising use case for the line of research presented in this paper is
the design of a model to extend quantum theory to a deterministic quantum
theory, as suggested by Einstein (1935). A concrete model modelling quantum
experiments, such as the EPR, as a game played between humans and the
universe that can be solved for its Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium is given
by Fourny (2019a).
As it turns out, the assumption that blocks deterministic extensions of
quantum theory in impossibility theorems (Renner and Colbeck, 2011) is the
exact same assumption made in the Nash paradigm, i.e., that decisions made
by physicists on what to measure, are made independently. It is the very
assumption that we as well as others (Halpern, Pass, Shiffrin, Hofstadter,
Shiffrin...) are challenging, leading to an alternate paradigm we call Non-
Nashian Decision Theory.
More on this is said in Section 7.11.
2 Background
Before we introduce our paradigm and the equilibrium, we start with a bit of
general (mainstream) background in game theory, on top of which the remain-
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C D
A u1(A,C), u2(A,C) u1(A,D), u2(A,D)
B u1(B,C), u2(B,C) u1(B,D), u2(B,D)
Fig. 2 A game in normal form, with two players that each can pick two strategies (A and
B for the row player, C and D for the column player)
Defect Cooperate
Defect 1, 1 3, 0
Cooperate 0, 3 2, 2
Fig. 3 The prisoner’s dilemma, the most known game in normal form. A player can either
cooperate or defect. If both cooperate, they get more than if both defect. However, a player
who unilaterally defects will get even more payoff than with mutual cooperation. In the
Nash equilibrium, both players defect as these strategies are each other’s best responses.
The individually rational outcomes are all those that weakly Pareto-dominate the maximin
tuple (1,1), that is, those on the diagonal.
der of the paper will build. We start with the definitions of games in normal
form as well as the Nash equilibrium, which is based on unilateral deviations.
2.1 Games in normal form
In game theory, games are typically expressed in two forms: normal form and
extensive form. In extensive form, the game is expressed as a tree. At each
node, a player picks a child node, and the leaves describe possible outcomes
and are labelled with payoffs. Such games are discussed by Fourny et al (2018)
and are thus omitted in this paper.
On the other hand, in normal form, the focus of this paper, time plays
no role and the payoffs are organized in a matrix—or a tensor of higher di-
mensionality than two if there are more than two players. Figure 2 shows a
two-player game in normal form. One player plays on the row, the other plays
on the columns.
Definition 1 (Game in normal form)
A game in normal form is defined with:
– a finite set of players P .
– a set of strategies Σi for each player i ∈ P .
– a specification of payoffs ui(
−→σ ) for each player i ∈ P and strategy profile−→σ = (σj)j∈P , where ∀i ∈ P, σi ∈ Σi.
The payoff space only needs to be totally ordered (preference relation). In
particular, when numbers are used, they are only meant as ordinals. In other
words, comparing 1 to 1000 is no different than comparing 1 to 2. This is why
in all our examples we use an increasing sequence of small integers.
Very often, given a player i, we denote as Σ−i the cartesian product of
the remaining strategy spaces, and given a strategy profile −→σ , we denote as
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A B C
D 6, 8 1, 2 4, 4
E 3, 1 0, 7 2, 3
F 7, 0 8, 5 5, 6
Fig. 4 A larger game, asymmetric and with general positions. The Nash equilibrium is CF,
i.e. (5, 6). Indeed, C is the best response to F (6 > 0 and 6 > 5) and F is the best response
to C (5 > 4 and 5 > 2). Other individually rational outcomes in addition to CF are AD
(6,8) and BF (8,5), because with any other outcome, the row player would deviate to F to
secure a minimum payoff of 5, or the column player would deviate to C to secure a minimum
payoff of 3.
σ−i the projection of the profile on Σ−i. This very conveniently allows writing
ui(
−→σ ) as ui(σi, σ−i) with a slight abuse of notation that is always clear from
the context.
We will only consider pure strategies, meaning that players may not use
randomness to build mixed strategies. The outcome of a game must thus always
be one of the strategy profiles of the normal form matrix, with each player
getting the corresponding payoff.
Furthermore, in this paper, we assume that there are no ties, meaning that
a player always has a strict preference between any two strategy profiles. This
assumption is also called general position in literature.
The players do not cooperate. They act selfishly, but accept and use the
laws of logics. They are also rational in the sense that they make decisions to
optimize their utility to the best of their knowledge or beliefs5. They commonly
know the structure of the game.
Finally, the game is only played once: this is not a repeated-game equilib-
rium.
Figures 3, and 4 show three famous examples of symmetric games. The
payoffs have been normalized to the first natural numbers as cardinality is
irrelevant.
2.2 Nash equilibria
Nash equilibria are defined having in mind that players hold their opponent’s
choices of strategies as fixed. In terms using the subjunctive tense6, if a player
had picked a different strategy, the other players’ strategies would still have
been the same. Payoffs are thus compared across rows or columns.
With this Nashian mindset, the definition of a Nash equilibrium naturally
arises as a strategy profile −→σ for which, for each player, the picked strategy
σi is the best response to the other players’ strategies σ−i.
Formally:
5 And the paradigm presented in this paper differs from Nash in terms of knowledge or
beliefs regarding the underlying assumptions. People can act rationally in different ways if
they have different beliefs.
6 As we will see in Section 3, this expresses a counterfactual dependency
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Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium) Given a game (P,Σ, u), a strategy profile−→σ is a Nash equilibrium if, for any player i ∈ P :
∀τi ∈ Σi, ui(σi, σ−i) ≥ ui(τi, σ−i)
Figures 3 and 4 show the Nash equilibria for our example games. In the
context of this paper, the most crucial part to understand in the Nash equilib-
rium is that only unilateral deviations are considered. This leads in particular
to dominant strategies, such as defecting in the prisoner’s dilemma, as 1 is
compared to 0 (in the same row or column) and 3 is compared to 2 (in the
same row or column).
2.3 Individual rationality
A broader (meaning, less restrictive) concept than the Nash equilibrium is
that of individual rationality. Individual rationality has been known for a few
decades in the context of a few theorems on repeated games commonly known
as folk theorems7.
Individual rationality is easiest to define negatively. Let us assume that the
strategies picked by all agents are known to all of them, and thus the complete
strategy profile (outcome) reached by the game is known as well to all agents.
If it is the case that, for one of the players, say, the row player, her payoff with
this strategy profile is worse for her than all of the payoffs on a different row,
then this outcome is said not to be individually rational. Indeed, this player
could have selected the strategy corresponding to this other row and would
then have secured, with 100% guarantee, a better payoff, so her initial choice
was illogical.
A Nash equilibrium is always individually rational. This follows directly
from the fact that each agent’s strategy is optimal given the other agent’s
strategies.
A positive (equivalent, but more formal) definition of individual rationality
is that a strategy profile is individually rational if it Pareto-dominates a virtual
strategy profile made of all “best worst payoffs”, that is, each player gets at
least what they have the power to guarantee themselves by picking the strategy
with the highest worst payoff, regardless of what the opponents do. Formally:
Definition 3 (individually rational strategy profile) a strategy profile−→σ is individually rational if
∀i ∈ P, ui(−→σ ) ≥ max
τi∈Σi
min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(
−→τ )
In the prisoner’s dilemma (Figure 3), the individually rational strategy
profiles are exactly those on the diagonal. Indeed, each player, by defecting,
7 as a consequence, there is no clear person to whom to attribute credits for this solution
concept
Perfect Prediction in Normal Form 11
has a guaranteed worst payoff of 1, so that any strategy profile with a 0 payoff
is not individually rational.
Figure 4 shows the individually rational strategies for the asymmetric
game. The maximin of the row player is 5, because strategy F guarantees
him a payoff of 5 no matter what. The maximin of the column player is 3,
because strategy C guarantees her a payoff of 3 no matter what. Thus, any
strategy profile that has at least a player’s payoff strictly smaller than their
maximin is not individually rational, as this player would otherwise deviate to
C resp. F. Three outcomes are individually rational: AD, BF and CF.
3 Newcomb’s problem and the non-Nashian approach
3.1 Newcomb’s problem
Game theory involves anticipating the decisions of players endowed with free
choice. The apparent conflict between the two concepts is embodied in New-
comb’s problem8, which is as follows.
An agent is facing two boxes, one is opaque and one is transparent. There
are $1,000 in the transparent box. The agent knows the opaque box is either
empty, or contains $1,000,000. The agent may either pick the opaque box, or
both boxes.
The catch is that, previously, an entity predicted what the agent would
do: if she predicted the agent would pick one box, she put $1,000,000 inside.
If she predicted the agent would pick two boxes, she put nothing inside. It is
further known that the predictor has done this thousands of times, and all her
predictions were correct hitherto.
This problem is often referred to as a paradox, because two lines of reason-
ing seem equally reasonable: a Nashian, dominant strategy argument compar-
ing $x to $x+1,000 leads to two boxes being optimal no matter what the value
of x is. But another reasoning taking for granted that the prediction is always
correct, compares $1,000 to $1,000,000 and leads to one box being optimal.
3.2 Several decision theories
Newcomb’s problem is often explained in light of Causal Decision Theory
(CDT) and Evidential Decision Theory (EDT), which maximize payoffs (util-
ity or value) in different ways (Weirich, 2016). Gibbard and Harper (1978)
showed that the difference comes down to distinguishing between probabili-
ties of subjunctive conditionals and conditional probabilities. Causal Decision
Theory (CDT), built on probabilities of subjunctive conditionals, supports
8 Newcomb’s problem is also called Newcomb’s paradox, however, as explained below, we
view it less a paradox than as a thought experiment to illustrate the importance of making
counterfactual dependencies explicit.
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two-boxers, while Evidential Decision Theory EDT), built on conditional prob-
abilities, supports one-boxers.
The framework introduced in this paper, is a third way out (Non-Nashian
Decision Theory, NNDT) that is neither CDT nor EDT, and which leads to
picking one box. In order to formally differentiate it from CDT and EDT,
we need to first introduce CDT and EDT on the example of the Newcomb
problem.
3.3 Possible worlds
Before we discuss the three decision theories, we say a few words about possible
worlds, which all approaches have in common underneath. Possible worlds
date back to as early as Gottfried Leibniz (1710), also with the notion of
maximization of a quantity over the set of possible worlds. Kripke (1963) later
designed a formal epistemic framework to model epistemic logic statements.
There are a lot of variants of such semantics, but we give here a short “Possible
worlds 101” that will help a larger audience understand counterfactuals as well
as the differences between the three decision theories.
In all cases, we have a set Ω of possible worlds, typically denoted w ∈ Ω.
Agents can make choices, and different choices are made in different worlds.
Formally, in each world, for each agent who has to make a choice, a specific
decision is made. In the case of Newcomb’s problem, in some of the worlds,
the agent picks one box, in some others the agent picks two boxes. Likewise,
in some worlds, the prediction is “one box” and in some other worlds, the
prediction is “two boxes”. In each world, the choice and the prediction are
unambiguously defined.
Events are subsets of Ω. For example “the agent picks one box” is an event
that corresponds to the subset of all worlds in which the agent picks one box.
It can, equivalently, be seen as a truth assignment (true or false) on Ω.
Knowledge, and often actually, incomplete knowledge, is formalized with
associating each world and agent to some subset of Ω. This relation is called
the accessibility relation. Saying that for some world w and agent i, a set A of
worlds is accessible, models the fact that agent i in world w knows that they are
in some world in A, but do not know which one exactly (so they may not know
that this is, actually, w). Typically, w ∈ A. If we allow for cases where w /∈ A,
we prefer the word “belief” (doxastic) to “knowledge” (epistemic) because the
agent may have incorrect beliefs. Very often, but not always, the accessibility
relation is simply expressed as a partition of Ω, which is a special case9. The
said agent knows or believes in an event B if B ⊆ A (modelling knowledge of
events in this way is probably the most brilliant insight of Kripke).
Necessity of an event A means that A = Ω. This is why necessary rational-
ity is the same as rationality in all possible worlds, etc. Perfect prediction, in
this paper, is simply defined as the fact that accessible worlds from w for any
9 when the relation is transitive, symmetric and reflexive.
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agents are the singleton {w}, and a full formal account is given in a technical
report (Fourny, 2018).
In a Bayesian approach, given some actual world, a probability measure is
introduced on accessible worlds (say, A). These probabilities model the relative
(un)certainty of the agent in their kowledge. Events can then be reinterpreted
as random variables, and we can also define conditional probabilities and com-
pute correlations, which is always symmetric. This is what EDT does. EDT
limits itself to worlds that are accessible from the actual world and does not
look beyond those.
In an approach with counterfactuals, a different relation on events, which
we denote here >, is introduced instead of correlations, and that relation can
be asymmetric. Given two events A and B, A > B is a subjunctive condi-
tional that says that ”if A were true, then B would be true”. The meaning
of counterfactuals has been discussed by Stalnaker (1968) and formalized by
Lewis (1973) in terms of possible worlds. Lewis suggested to organize alter-
nate possible worlds (taken from Ω) around the actual world, with a notion
of distance. Then, the counterfactual statement, or subjunctive conditional,
A > B
is true in some world w if, in the closest world to w in which A is true, denoted
f(w,A), B is also true. A > B is thus, formally, also an event, like its operands
A or B. This means that counterfactuals nest recursively, and we can also write
f(w,A > B), f(f(w,A), B), etc.
The term “counterfactual” comes from the fact that f(w,A) may (but
need not) be an inaccessible world (contrary to the facts known in w). The
approach with counterfactuals is taken both by CDT and our third theory
NNDT, and the difference lies in whether the past is (CDT), or does not have
to be (NNDT), counterfactually independent of an agent’s decision.
Within CDT and NNDT, we can also define probabilities on subjunctive
conditionals, i.e., they are random variables, too, but it is absolutely crucial
to see that their nature is fundamentally different than (always symmetric)
conditional probabilities. A very simple counterexample is that subjunctive
conditionals do not generally follow the total law of probability. 10.
With this in mind, let us now interpret Newcomb’s problem which each
one of the three theories in turn and show that, in all three cases, the agent is
maximizing their utility.
3.4 Event notations for Newcomb’s problem
In the following, we consider the following events, subject to some underlying
probability distribution:  is the event that the opaque box has a million
10 The fact that subjunctive conditionals do not fulfill the law of total probability is well
known to physicists specialized in quantum foundations. This is known as contextuality.
This law is replaced with the Born rule.
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dollars inside.  is the event that the opaque box is empty. ONE is the event
that one picks one box. TWO is the event that one picks two boxes.
Furthermore, we have a random variable P that is the choosing agent’s
utility (in dollars). This variable has an expected value if the agent picks one
box, EONE [P ], and an expected value if the agent picks two boxes, ETWO[P ].
All decision theory frameworks have in common that utility is maximized.
They differ in the definition of EONE [P ] (the expected utility if one picks one
box) and ETWO[P ] (the expected utility if one picks two boxes) out of the four
possibilities:
ETWO,[P ] = 1, 001, 000
EONE,[P ] = 1, 000, 000,
ETWO,[P ] = 1, 000,
and
EONE,[P ] = 0
3.5 Causal Decision Theory
In causal decision theory, the impact of the decision on the environment, and in
turn on the payoffs, is modelled with probabilities of subjunctive conditionals.
ONE >  is the event that ”If I picked one box, then the opaque box
would have a million dollars”. ONE >  is the event that ”If I picked one
box, then the opaque box would be empty”.
Causal Decision Theorists compute the expected utility like so:
ECDTONE [P ] = EONE,[P ] ∗ P (ONE > ) + EONE,[P ] ∗ P (ONE > )
and
ECDTTWO[P ] = ETWO,[P ] ∗ P (TWO > ) + ETWO,[P ] ∗ P (TWO > )
There is an another important assumption commonly made in Causal Deci-
sion Theory: namely, that if an agent makes a free decision, it is counterfactu-
ally independent of anything not in its future. Since the decision cannot cause
its anticipation, it follows, according to Causal Decision Theorists, that the
anticipation is counterfactually independent of the decision. Stalnaker (1972)
thus argues that the probability of the subjunctive conditional “were one to
take one box, the prediction would have been one-box” should be the same as
the probability that the prediction is one-box.
In other words, since the decision in Newcomb’s problem is in the future
of when the box is filled
P (ONE > ) = P ()
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and
P (ONE > ) = P ()
In other words, the decision has no impact on the content of the opaque
box. As a consequence, the expected are calculated like so:
ECDTONE [P ] = 1000000 ∗ P (ONE > ) + 0 ∗ P (ONE > )
= 1000000 ∗ P () + 0 ∗ P ()
= 1000000 ∗ P ()
ECDTTWO[P ] = 1001000 ∗ P (TWO > ) + 1000 ∗ P (TWO > )
= 1001000 ∗ P () + 1000 ∗ P ()
= 1000000 ∗ P () + 1000 ∗ (P () + P ())
= ECDTONE [P ] + 1000
> ECDTONE [P ]
which leads to the decision of picking two boxes, which has the higher
utility.
3.6 Evidential Decision Theory
Evidential decision theorists, on the other hands, compute the expected utility
with conditional probabilities involving the events ONE, TWO,  and .
Conditional probabilities behave differently than subjunctive conditionals.
In the EDT framework, the expected utilities for the two possible choices
are calculated with:
EEDTONE [P ] = EONE,[P ] ∗ P (|ONE) + EONE,[P ] ∗ P (|ONE))
and
EEDTONE [P ] = ETWO,[P ] ∗ P (|TWO) + ETWO,[P ] ∗ P (|TWO))
where it is assumed from the problem formulation that
P (|ONE) = P (|TWO) = 1
and
P (|TWO) = P (|ONE) = 0
As a consequence:
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EEDTTWO[P ] = 1001000 ∗ P (|TWO) + 1000 ∗ P (|TWO))
= 1001000 ∗ 0 + 1000 ∗ 1
= 1000
EEDTONE [P ] = 1000000 ∗ P (|ONE) + 0 ∗ P (|ONE))
= 1000000 ∗ 1 + 0 ∗ 0
= 1000000 > EEDTTWO[P ]
and thus it is rational to pick one box.
3.7 A third way out: Non-Nashian Decision Theory
The discussion between CDT and EDT is the subject of a very intense debate.
But we would like to argue, here, that there is more to this.
Causal Decision Theory is not only characterized by the use of probabil-
ity of subjunctive conditionals. A paramount assumption in CDT is also the
strong, Nashian free-choice assumption that the prediction of a decision is
counterfactually independent from this decision.
Dupuy (1992) argues that it is crucial to distinguish causal from counter-
factual independence. Indeed, the absence of causation does not, in general
and also according to the laws of physics, imply counterfactual independence.
Measuring entangled particles in quantum systems provides an illustration of
this, as it can be expressed by subjunctive conditionals: if the measurement
on the one side had been different, then the measurement on the other side
would also have been counterfactually different, even though no causal effect
can apply.
Using the probability of the subjunctive conditionals as in CDT, but re-
placing the free-choice assumption with a counterfactual dependency between
the decision and its prediction yields a new theory of rational choice. Let us
call this new, third theory Non-Nashian Decision Theory (NNDT).
So in NNDT we do use, as in CDT, subjunctive conditionals, but if we drop
the free-choice assumption, and assume instead that the prediction is coun-
terfactually dependent on the decision, the following subjunctive conditionals
are always true:
“if one had picked one box, the prediction would have been one-box”
“if one had picked two boxes, the prediction would have been two-boxes”
then we have
P (ONE > ) = P (TWO > ) = 1
and
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P (TWO > ) = P (ONE > ) = 0
And as a consequence:
ENNDTTWO [P ] = 1001000 ∗ P (TWO > ) + 1000 ∗ P (TWO > ))
= 1001000 ∗ 0 + 1000 ∗ 1
= 1000
ENNDTONE [P ] = 1000000 ∗ P (ONE > ) + 0 ∗ P (ONE > ))
= 1000000 ∗ 1 + 0 ∗ 0
= 1000000 > ENNDTTWO [P ]
and the expected utility of picking one box outweighs that of picking two.
Although the calculation, in the very case of the Newcomb problem, is
similar and yields the same result than EDT, it is crucial to understand that
the underlying reasoning is very different. Picking one box, in the NNDT
mindset, is not mere evidence that the prediction was “one box”. Picking
one box has a counterfactual impact on the prediction via the counterfactual
function, something formally modelled with Lewisian counterfactual functions.
To understand this, it helps to consider that the agent may not be able to
distinguish whether they are actually making their decision, or whether they
are being simulated by the predictor.
As explained in Fourny et al (2018), Newcomb’s problem is underspeci-
fied in the sense that this Lewisian counterfactual function corresponding to
changing one’s choice is not constrained by the problem formulation.
In a CDT mindset, the counterfactual function expresses that the predic-
tion would have been the same if one had decided otherwise. In Nashian game
theory, this translates to unilateral deviations of strategies.
In the NNDT mindset, the counterfactual function expresses that the pre-
diction would also have been correct if one had decided otherwise. This is a
weaker form of free choice in which the agent could have acted otherwise, but
if they had, then the prediction would have been different.
In the EDT mindset, there are no counterfactual functions at all, only
conditional probabilities. It is important to understand that NNDT is distinct
from EDT
Gibbard and Harper (1978), Lewis (1979) and Dupuy (1992) argued that
there is a direct analogy between Newcomb’s problem and the prisoner’s
dilemma: in both problems, the question is whether the decisions are coun-
terfactually interdependent (NNDT), counterfactually dependent (CDT), or
statistically correlated (EDT).
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4 Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies in
game theory
Now, let us come back to game theory.
4.1 CDT and Nash equilibria
CDT and NNDT both rely on subjunctive counterfactuals modelling the im-
pact of decisions on utilities, but differ in a fundamental way, namely: whether
or not a decision is counterfactually independent from anything it could not
have caused11.
The Nash paradigm directly follows the CDT paradigm. Let us take the
example of games in normal form, in which players may be, for example, in
separate rooms to pick their strategies. If an agent’s decision is counterfactually
independent from anything it could not have caused, then this means that
if some agent Mary picks strategy σi and the other agents picked strategy
σ−i, the following counterfactual statement holds: “Had Mary picked another
strategy τi, the other agents would still have picked strategies σ−i.” In Lewisian
terms: in the closest world in which Mary picks τi, the other agents jointly pick
σ−i like in the actual world. Mary’s decision has no impact on the other agents’
strategies.
This counterfactual statement is exactly what is known as unilateral devi-
ations. It is thus rational for Mary to pick σi over τi if
12
∀τi 6= σi, ui(σi, σ−i) > ui(τi, σ−i)
In Lewisian semantics: Mary is rational because she gets a higher utility
in the actual world than in the closest world in which she picks τi, for any
τi 6= σi. She would have gotten less utility if she had picked another strategy.
This is why the Nash equilibrium is computed by finding best responses to
the opponents’ strategies, by fixing a row or column and maximizing utility
over it. The Nash equilibrium is reached under this strong free choice assump-
tion and assuming Common Knowledge of Rationality in the actual world.
4.2 Perfect Prediction and non-Nashian thinking: Necessary Knowledge of
Strategies and Necessary Rationality
Hofstadter was the first, to our knowledge, to drop the strong free choice
assumption in a game-theoretical context. The Hofstadter equilibrium (Hofs-
tadter, 1983) is defined for symmetric games (see a formal definition in Section
8 in which all agents have the same choice of strategies and the same payoff
11 The latter part of this formulation of the strong version of free choice is attributable to
theoretical physicists (Renner and Colbeck, 2011), even though they refer in this paper to
conditional probabilities and the absence of correlations.
12 The inequality is always strict because of the assumption of general positions.
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configurations, and limits the possible outcomes of the game to the diagonal
(see a formal definition in Section 8.2). While many refer to Hofstadter’s idea
(superrationality) in terms of EDT, we argue here that it is also meaningful, if
not more meaningful, to formulate it in subjunctive conditionals – within our
third decision theory, NNDT. It is doing so that provides a way to generalize
the reasoning to asymmetric games.
Formally, this is, again, supported by a counterfactual statement:
“If Mary had picked another strategy τ , then all other agents would have
picked that same strategy τ .”
It can immediately be seen that this counterfactual statement is in direct
contradiction with the CDT statement made in the former section: we are in
the NNDT realm, in which deviations need not be unilateral.
It is rational to cooperate for the prisoner’s dilemma, because, had one
defected, the opponent would have defected too.
Thus, under NNDT, utility is maximized, but on the diagonal, based on the
counterfactual impact of a deviation of strategy on the other agents’ strategies:
ui(C,C) > ui(D,D)
This is to be contrasted to the comparison that is done in CDT leading to
defection:
ui(C,C) < ui(D,C)
Now, let us dig into the counterfactual reasoning.
First, we are going to drop the CDT free choice assumption to obtain the
NNDT paradigm.
Second, more specifically, we are going to replace this assumption with
Perfect Prediction assumptions. This is one way to instantiate the NNDT
paradigm – there are other ways with weaker assumptions than Perfect Pre-
diction (see Halpern and Pass (2018) for example).
Perfect Prediction relies on two fundamental principles, which are embod-
ied in Hofstadter’s original statement in Section 1, and were precisely laid out
by Dupuy (1992) and Dupuy (2000) as projected time:
– Principle 1: Necessary Knowledge of Strategies. The agents know each
other’s strategies in all possible worlds. Let us express this in counter-
factual terms. All agents know, in advance, the outcome (strategy profile)
that the game will reach, say σ. If the outcome of the game had been dif-
ferent, say τ – that is, if an agent had acted otherwise – then all agents
would have known that it would have been τ .
– Principle 2: Necessary Rationality. All agents are rational in all possible
worlds. In counterfactual terms, if a player had picked a different strat-
egy, all agents would still have acted rationally. Necessary Rationality is a
stronger assumption than Common Knowledge of Rationality: if the agents
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are rational in all possible worlds, then it follows in the actual world that
the agents know, and commonly know, that they are rational13.
The decision making and the prediction of the actual outcome of the game
itself relies solely on mathematical and logical computations, and is a conse-
quence of the at-most uniqueness of the outcome that can possibly be reached
under this belief. Actually, the reasoning is based on reductio ad absurdum,
showing that alternate candidate worlds are, in fact, “impossible possible”
worlds14.
The formalization of a game-theoretical equilibrium in extensive form –
when agents play one after the other – has already been published by Fourny
et al (2018) as the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE) under these same
assumptions of Necessary Knowledge of Strategies and Necessary Rationality.
The reasoning behind the PPE is closely related to the elapse of time: saying
that the solution must be immune to its prediction actually amounts to say
that the solution must be caused by its prediction, like a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In this paper, we are looking at games in normal form. We call the equi-
librium the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium (PTE).
4.3 A reformulation of the Prisoner’s dilemma reasoning
Let us now revisit the prisoner’s dilemma, shown on Figure 3 with the above
principles of Necessary Knowledge of Strategies and Necessary Rationality in
mind, and now departing from any diagonal argument nor using the knowledge
that the game is symmetric.
We can start the reasoning, under the assumptions of Necessary Rationality
and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies, by looking, for each possible strategy
that a player can pick, for the worst payoff he can possibly get. The row player
gets at least 0 by cooperating, and at least 1 by defecting. The same applies to
the column player. We can thus see that defecting guarantees to both players
a payoff of at least 1: this is the maximin of both players.
4.3.1 First round of elimination
All outcomes that are not individually rational can be shown to be incom-
patible with Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies.
13 It is a very short proof that we can easily summarize here: An event – or logical predicate
– can be canonically identified with the set of the possible worlds in which this event happens.
In Kripke (1963) semantics, knowledge of an event is defined as the fact that the set of all
epistemically accessible worlds is included in this event. Necessary rationality means that
the event that the agents are rational is the set of all possible worlds – the inclusion thus
follows trivially, and common knowledge follows (i) by repeating this argument in every
possible world, which leads to necessary knowledge of rationality, and then (ii) by applying
the entire argument recursively on the event of (knowledge of)n rationality for any n.
14 We use this terminology having in mind the work of Rantala (1982) and Kripke (1965).
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Actually, they are even incompatible with the weaker assumptions of rational-
ity (in the actual world) and knowledge of strategies (correct prediction in the
actual world).
Let us show, for example, that outcome (0,3), reached when the row player
cooperates and the column player defects (CD), is inconsistent with these
assumptions.
Let us assume the row player choses to cooperate and knows that the
outcome of the game will be CD (0,3). This means he gets a payoff of 0.
Is he rational? By definition, he is if he gets a better utility with his actual
choice than the utility he would have counterfactually obtained if his choice
had been different. So what if he had defected? We need to look at the “coun-
terfactual payoff” that he would have gotten if he had defected. The following
statement holds directly because of the rules of the game itself (all payoffs for
the row player on the D line are at least 1) – and this is completely independent
from anything the column player would have done:
“If the row player had chosen to defect, he would have obtained a payoff
of at least 1.”
So if he had chosen to defect, the row player would have obtained a better
payoff (1 < 0). Thus, we proved that (note the indicative tense: this is a logical
implication):
“if the row player choses to cooperate and knows that the final outcome
will be CD (0,3), then his decision to cooperate is not rational.”
Likewise for DC (3,0), we can assume the column player choses to coop-
erate, knowing the outcome of the game will be DC (3,0) and that she thus
gets 0. But if she had defected, she would have obtained at least 1. Thus, we
showed that the following logical statement holds
“If the column player choses to cooperate and knows that the final outcome
will be CD (0,3), then her decision to cooperate is not rational.”
This same reasoning can be done, for any game, with any outcome that is
not individually rational: non-individually rational outcomes cannot be will-
ingly reached under Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strate-
gies. Since the maximin of both players is 1, any outcome with a payoff less
than 1 for the row player, or with a payoff less than 1 for the column player,
contradicts our assumptions. This is the case with DC and CD.
The first and second matrix on Figure 5 show the elimination of CD and
DC on the game.
What about the other outcomes? At that first step, only assuming rational-
ity and knowledge of strategies, we cannot do better than that. For example,
(1,1) or (2,2) may or may not correspond to a rational behavior of the players,
which depends on the counterfactual payoffs, the payoffs that the agents would
otherwise have gotten if they had played otherwise. In order to tell, we need
to get to step 2 of the reasoning.
The key part of the reasoning is the awareness of the fact that these two
outcomes DC (3,0) and CD (0,3) cannot be the solutions of the game under
our assumptions. With these outcomes discarded, we can enter further rounds
of elimination with the same reasoning: step 2.
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C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1,1
⇒
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1,1
⇒
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1,1
Fig. 5 Iterated elimination of preempted strategy profiles in the Prisoner’s dilemma. (2,2)
is the unique PTE and coincides with the Hofstadter, superrational equilibrium.
4.3.2 It is irrational to defect
At step 2, we re-iterate our reasoning by looking for the maximins – but taking
into account that the players cannot knowingly and rationally play towards
either DC (3,0) or CD (0,3).
The row player has a minimum guaranteed payoff of 1 if he defects, and of
2 if he cooperates (because CD has been eliminated). His maximin is thus 2.
Likewise, the column player has a maximin of 2.
With these maximins in mind, we can proceed with a reasoning that elim-
inates any outcomes with a payoff of less than 2 for the row player, or of less
than 2 for the row player. The only such outcome is DD (1,1). We now thus
show that DD (1,1) cannot be possibly reached under Necessary Rationality
and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies. For this, we show that, if all of the
following holds:
1. the row player choses to defect and knows that the final outcome will be
DD (1,1) (principle 2);
2. the row player would have acted rationally if he had cooperated (principle
1);
3. the row player would also have known the outcome if it had been different
(principle 2).
then the row player is not acting rationally.
So let us assuming that the row player defects, and that he knows the
final outcome will be DD and thus gets a payoff of 1. In order to tell whether
he is rational, we need to know what payoff he would have gotten if he had
cooperated.
From point 3 above, we know that if he had cooperated, and thus reached
a different outcome, he would have known this alternate outcome. We also
established, in the previous section, that if, in some possible world, the row
player choses to cooperate and knows that the final outcome will be CD (0,3),
then his decision to cooperate is not rational.
It follows that, if the row player had chosen to cooperate, the final outcome
could not have been CD, as (i) knowing this, he would then have been irra-
tional, and (ii) point 2 above says that he had chosen to cooperate, he would
have been rational.
Thus, if the row player had cooperated, the final outcome would have been
CC (2, 2), and he would have obtained a payoff of 2.
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Since 2 > 1, it followed directly that the row player, choosing to defect
and knowing that if had cooperated he would have gotten a higher payoff, is
irrational.
(1,1) is thus also incompatible with Necessary Rationality and Necessary
Knowledge of Strategies.
4.3.3 It is rational to cooperate
In the Nash paradigm, we compare payoffs to find a best response to the op-
ponent’s strategy, held fixed, and this best response is the rational choice. But
in the non-Nashian paradigm, knowing that it is irrational to defect does not
imply that it is rational to cooperate, because utilities are compared against
alternate possible worlds, and counterfactual dependencies are not a symmet-
ric relationship in general. We need to show that it is rational to cooperate
with a separate reasoning.
For this, we show that, if all of the following holds:
1. the row player choses to cooperate and knows that the final outcome will
be CC (2,2) (principle 2);
2. the column player15 would have acted rationally if the row player had
defected (principle 1);
3. the column player would also have known the outcome if it had been dif-
ferent (principle 2).
then the row player is acting rationally.
So let us assume that the row player cooperates, and that he knows the
final outcome will be CC and thus gets a payoff of 2. In order to tell whether
he is rational, we need to know what payoff he would have gotten if he had
defected.
From point 3 above, we know that if he had defected, and thus reached
a different outcome, the column player would have known this alternate out-
come. We also established, in the previous section, that if, in some possible
world, the column player choses to cooperate and knows that the final outcome
will be DC (3, 0), then her decision to cooperate is not rational.
It follows that, if the row player had chosen to defect, the final outcome
could not have been DC, as (i) knowing this, the column player would then
have been irrational, and (ii) point 2 above says that he had chosen to defect,
she – the column player – would have been rational.
Thus, if the row player had defected, the final outcome would have been
DD (1, 1), and he would have obtained a payoff of 1.
Since 1 > 2, it followed directly that the row player, choosing to cooperate
and knowing that if had defected he would have gotten a lesser payoff, is action
rationally.
The same reasoning can be done for the column player, for whom it is
rational to cooperate under our assumptions.
15 We do mean the column player – this shows how this differs from the reasoning in the
previous section, because counterfactual dependencies are asymmetric.
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The only remaining outcome, (2,2), thus correspond to the rational choice
of cooperating for both players, under Necessary Rationality and Necessary
Knowledge of Strategies. This is shown on the final matrix of Figure 5.
The key difference with the Nash equilibrium is in the counterfactual state-
ments, which lead to a different comparison of the utilities obtained with each
strategic choice and under counterfactual implications. Under Necessary Ra-
tionality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies (or the belief there of), it is
rational for both players to cooperate.
This line of reasoning reaches the same outcome as Douglas Hofstadter’s
reasoning, but does not use the argument of symmetry. It can thus be extended
to other games in normal form. This is what we are going to do now.
5 The Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium
The PTE is defined for games in normal form, with one additional assumption
similar to that of its extensive form counterpart, namely, that the payoffs
are in general position. In this part, we give a general, formal algorithm that
reproduces the reasoning made in Section 4. The epistemic proof based on
Kripke semantics is given as a separate technical report (Fourny, 2018) and is
too long (32 pages) to be included in this paper.
5.1 Preemption
The PTE is based on an iterated elimination of strategy profiles that cannot
be possibly the solution of the game under Necessary Knowledge of Strategies
and Necessary Rationality, because players otherwise would have deviated.
The elimination of such strategy profiles is called preemption.
Informally, a strategy profile −→τ is preempted by a strategy σi (of any player
i) if player i is worse off with −→τ than with the minimum payoff that she is
assured to get with σi no matter what the opponents would (counterfactually)
have done had she picked σi. It would be thus be irrational to a player to pick
τi under our assumptions.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, for example, at step 1, CD is preempted by the
row player defecting, and DC is preempted by the column player defecting.
5.1.1 The first round of elimination: individual rationality
The complete elimination scheme is obtained by finding the maximin utility.
The concept of maximin utility is commonly found in game theory literature,
and is used in the definition of individual rationality. Each strategy has a
minimum guaranteed payoff (no matter what the opponents would do), and
the maximin utility for a given player is the maximal utility among these
minimum guaranteed payoffs.
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All strategy profiles that do not Pareto dominate the maximin utility, that
is, that are not individually rational, are preempted. Indeed, if a strategy
profile gives, to some player, a payoff inferior to their maximin utility, it means
that the player, who would be worse off with this strategy profile, could simply
have deviated to the strategy that guarantees him his maximin utility. He
would thus not have been rational.
Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies16 together
entail that such outcomes that are not individually rational are thus impossi-
ble.
In other words, the first round of elimination comes down to eliminating
all strategy profiles that are not individually rational.
Definition 4 (1st-level-preempted strategy profile) Given a game in
normal form, with pure strategies and with no ties Γ = (P, (Σi)i, (ui)i), a
strategy profile is 1st-level-preempted if it is not individually rational. In other
words, any strategy profile that does not Pareto-dominate the maximin utility
is 1st-level-preempted. For a game Γ , the strategy profiles −→σ ∈ S1(Γ ) that
survive the first round of elimination are characterized with:
S1(Γ ) = {−→σ | ∀i ∈ P, ui(−→σ ) ≥ max
τi∈Σi
min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(τi, τ−i)}
In literature, the maximin utility is often called a minimax, which deserves
a clarification to avoid any confusion. Depending on the context, this is on the
one hand because a maximin on the gains is equivalent to a minimax on the
losses, i.e., a players minimizes the worst-case loss. Some frameworks are based
on losses rather than gains. This is also, on the other hand, because in zero-
sum games, a maximin on an agent’s gains is equivalent to a minimax on the
opponent’s gains (and to a maximin on the opponent’s losses). We stick to the
maximin terminology because we are looking at gains, and the formula reads
as “maximin”. Our definition of individual rationality matches that given by
Halpern and Pass (2018).
5.1.2 Subsequent rounds of elimination
In subsequent rounds of eliminations, only strategy profiles that survived pre-
vious rounds can be considered for computing the minimums in the maximin
utility. Indeed, in all possible worlds, both agents know the laws of logics, and
under Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies, came to
the conclusion that eliminated strategy profiles are impossible17. This is the
distinctive feature of Perfect Prediction and of the PTE.
16 As illustrated in the former section, for the first step rationality and knowledge of
strategies in the actual world are sufficient to assume
17 In the formal sense of impossible possible worlds, see (Rantala, 1982). In these worlds,
truth is assigned manually to logical formulas, and the assignment may contradict logical
axioms and rules. More details are found in Fourny (2018).
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Also, a strategy cannot preempt in subsequent rounds if all the strategy
profiles it contains have been eliminated in previous rounds – Indeed, if all
strategy profiles under a strategy are known to be impossible under Necessary
Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies, then the strategy itself is
impossible18. It can thus no longer be considered in the computation of the
maximum in the maximin utility19.
We now give the definition of subsequent rounds, when we no longer con-
sider previously eliminated strategy profiles.
Definition 5 (kth-level-preempted strategy profile) Given a game in
normal form, with pure strategies and with no ties Γ = (P, (Σi)i, (ui)i), a
strategy profile is kth-level-preempted, for k > 1, if it does not Pareto-dominate
the maximin utility, where the maximin is only taking into account strategy
profiles that are not (k−1)th-level preempted. The strategy profiles −→σ ∈ Sk(Γ )
that survived the kth round of elimination are characterized with:
Sk(Γ ) = {−→σ |∀i ∈ P, ui(−→σ ) ≥
max
τi ∈ Σi
s.t.∃τ−i∈Σ−i,(τi,τ−i)∈Sk−1(Γ )
min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
s.t.(τi,τ−i)∈Sk−1(Γ )
ui(τi, τ−i)}
5.1.3 Convergence
The iterated elimination converges at some point.
Lemma 1 (Convergence) The sequence of sets (Si(Γ ))i∈N converges and
reaches its limit: at a certain point, no more strategy profiles get eliminated.
We denote this limit S(Γ )
Proof (Convergence) The maximin utility, in each round, Pareto-dominates
the previous one. This is because (i) all profiles that have, for any player,
lower payoffs than their previous maximin utility, were eliminated and (ii) for
any player, the maximin utility actually appears as a payoff somewhere in the
game because the game is finite.
Since the sequence (Si(Γ ))i∈N is decreasing and has its values in a finite
set (in the powerset of all strategy profiles), it must converge and reach its
limit. 
18 It does not entail that the agent has no free will. Picking this strategy would rather
be an indication that the agent does not act rationally, or does not act to the best of their
knowledge, under the assumptions at hand. Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge
of Strategies would then not hold. This is, of course, a different kind of rationality, as an
irrational strategy according to the PTE may be rational under Nash semantics, and vice-
versa. In both cases, agents optimize their utility to the best of their knowledge, but the
counterfactual knowledge assumptions differ between the semantics.
19 This must be made explicit in the equation, as in the extensive form, as we will shortly
see. This is because otherwise, the minimum utility for a strategy in which all strategy
profiles have been eliminated would be +∞, and the maximin utility would then be +∞
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5.2 Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium
We can finally give a definition of the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for
games in normal form, and characterize it with the previous sequence of sets
of surviving strategy profiles.
Definition 6 (Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for games in nor-
mal form) Given a game in normal form Γ , with pure strategies and with no
ties, a Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium is a strategy profile that never gets
eliminated. It is immune to Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge
of Strategies, in the sense that the players willingly, rationally jointly play
towards this outcome. The set of Perfectly Transparent Equilibria is S(Γ ).
The algorithm for computing the PTE for any game in normal form and
with no ties follows: one iteratively eliminates, in each round, all strategy
profiles that do not Pareto dominate the current tuple of maximin utilities.
5.3 Properties of the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium
We now give two theoretical results concerning the PTE on games in normal
form: uniqueness and Pareto optimality. The proofs are relatively straightfor-
ward.
Theorem 1 (Uniqueness) Given a game in normal form, with pure strate-
gies and with no ties, if a PTE exists, then it is unique.
It is important to note that the equilibrium does not always exists. We
provide counterexamples in Section 9.
Proof (Uniqueness) The sequence (Si(Γ ))i∈N is strictly decreasing until either
the empty set or a singleton is reached. This is because there are no ties: for
any player, the current maximin utility must, by definition of the max, be
strictly greater than one of the payoffs for a different strategy (which exists
for at least one player if the current set is not a singleton). The corresponding
strategy profile will be eliminated in the next round. As a consequence, the
sequence can only converge towards a singleton (this is the unique PTE of the
game) or the empty set (there are no PTEs for the game). 
Theorem 2 (Pareto optimality) Given a game in normal form, with pure
strategies and with no ties, if the PTE exists, then it is Pareto-optimal amongst
all strategy profiles.
Proof (Pareto optimality) If an existing PTE were not Pareto-optimal, then
there would be a distinct strategy profile that Pareto-dominates the PTE.
But this strategy profile would not have been eliminated in the last strictly
decreasing round of elimination, because it would also Pareto-dominate the
current tuple of maximin utilities and be a PTE as well. This contradicts
uniqueness. 
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C D
A 0, 2 2, 3
B 3, 0 1,1
⇒
C D
A 0, 2 2, 3
B 3, 0 1,1
⇒
C D
A 0, 2 2, 3
B 3, 0 1,1
Fig. 6 Iterated elimination of preempted strategy profiles in an asymmetric game. The
tuples of maximin utilities are (1,1), then (2,3). (2,3) is the unique PTE and is immune
against the common knowledge that it is the PTE.
6 Examples
In this section, we give a few more examples of games and PTE computations,
besides the prisoner’s dilemma already solved in Section 4.3. We start with an
asymmetric game, then continue with a few games satisfying criteria that make
them “social dilemma”, both symmetric and asymmetric, and in particular
show that the PTE solves these social dilemma where Nash equilibria do not.
6.1 Solving the PTE on an asymmetric game
Figure 6 shows an asymmetric game. Let us show that this game has a PTE.
In the first round, the players’ maximin utilities are (1,1), with the maximin
strategies being B guaranteeing 1 to the row player and D guaranteeing 1 to the
column player. Strategy profiles AC (0,2) and BC (3,0) are eliminated because
they do not Pareto-dominate the maximin tuple. Specifically, AC is preempted
by B because the row player would in any case better a better payoff than 0 if
he picked B instead. BC is preempted by D because the column player would
in any case get a better payoff than 0 if she picked D instead.
In the second round, the new maximin utilities are (2,1). BD is preempted
by A: if it were known to be the solution, the row player would pick A instead.
Indeed, he knows that if he picked A instead, then the column player would
have picked D as it was shown that AC is incompatible with the assumed row
player’s rationality, which applies in any possible world.
Only AD (2,3) remains, which is stable and immune to Necessary Ratio-
nality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies. Knowing that AD (2,3) is the
PTE, both players will stick to their strategy based on the above reasoning,
as no other strategy profile is reasonable: If the row player had picked B in-
stead, then the column player would have still picked D and the payoff with
AD would be less (1 < 2). If the column player had picked C instead, then
either the row player would not have picked A because this would have been
irrational, or BC would have been the known outcome and it is the column
player that would not have been rational preferring 0 over a guarantee of 1.
So AD (2,3) is the outcome willingly and knowingly obtained by rational
players under Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies:
it is the PTE. It happens, in this case, to also be a Nash equilibrium because
A and D are best responses to each other.
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D I C
D 1, 1 1.375, 0.5 1.75, 0.75
I 0.5, 1.375 1.25,1.25 1.625,1.125
C 0.75, 1.7 1.125,1.625 1.5,1.5
⇒
D I C
D 1, 1 1.375, 0.5 1.75, 0.75
I 0.5, 1.375 1.25,1.25 1.625,1.125
C 0.75, 1.7 1.125,1.625 1.5,1.5
⇒
D I C
D 1, 1 1.375, 0.5 1.75, 0.75
I 0.5, 1.375 1.25,1.25 1.625,1.125
C 0.75, 1.7 1.125,1.625 1.5,1.5
⇒
D I C
D 1, 1 1.375, 0.5 1.75, 0.75
I 0.5, 1.375 1.25,1.25 1.625,1.125
C 0.75, 1.7 1.125,1.625 1.5,1.5
Fig. 7 The Goods game with two players, a constant factor of 1.5 and discrete possible
contributions: nothing (D), half (I), everything (C). The PTE and the Hofstadter equilibrium
coincide on (1.5, 1.5). The Nash equilibrium is, however, (1,1) because C is a dominant
strategy for all players.
6.2 Public Goods game
The Public Goods game is one of the social dilemma presented by Capraro
and Halpern (2015).
Capraro and Halpern (2015) define a social dilemma as follows: (i) the
game has exactly one Nash equilibrium and (ii) the game has exactly one
improvement over the Nash equilibrium, i.e., exactly one profile, distinct from
the Nash equillibrium, that Pareto-dominates the Nash equilibrium.
In some cases, the PTE is this exact outcome that Pareto-dominates the
Nash equilibrium. In some other cases with several Pareto-optima, the PTE is
a different Pareto-optimal outcome, but does not Pareto-dominate the Nash
equilibrium.
Each player has one dollar and can decide to contribute part of it to the
pool. Then, the pool is multiplied by a factor greater than 1 and smaller than
the number of players, and is then evenly distributed to the players.
For a player i ∈ P contributing xi > 0, the worst that can happen is that
nobody else contributed. In this case, he is left with less than a dollar.
His maximin is thus 1, and is obtained by contributing nothing. At this
first stage, we thus know that under Necessary Rationality and Necessary
Knowledge of Strategies, all agents are guaranteed to not lose anything.
We give an example with two players, a constant factor of 1.5 and contri-
butions of 0, 0.5 and 1 on Figure 7. We can see that this game has no ties,
that the PTE exists, is unique and coincides with the Hofstadter equilibrium
on everybody contributing the as much as they can.
In the more general case with no ties, any number of players and any con-
stant, the reasoning at every round of elimination is that a higher worst case
than the minimum possible contribution (taking eliminated profiles into ac-
count) can be obtained by contributing a bit more (because there are no ties,
and lower payoffs were eliminated in previous rounds). The elimination se-
quence then converges to the bottom-right, welfare-maximizing profile, which
is the PTE. The PTE thus explains full cooperation on this game.
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2 4 6
2 1, 1 2, 0 2, 0
4 0, 2 2, 2 4, 0
6 0, 2 0, 4 3, 3
⇒
2 4 6
2 1, 1 2, 0 2, 0
4 0, 2 2, 2 4, 0
6 0, 2 0, 4 3, 3
⇒
2 4 6
2 1, 1 2, 0 2, 0
4 0, 2 2, 2 4, 0
6 0, 2 0, 4 3, 3
Fig. 8 The Bertrand Competition game with two players with prices settable to 2, 4 or 6.
The PTE and the Hofstadter equilibrium coincide on the welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium is, however, (1,1) because 2 is a dominant strategy for all players.
6.3 Bertrand Competition
Another example of game by Capraro and Halpern (2015) is the Bertrand
Competition game, where companies set their prices. Only those with the
lowest price sell their product, sharing among ties. Figure 8 shows how to
solve this game for its PTE, which exists in this case.
The Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium coincides with all companies pick-
ing the highest price, which is the welfare-maximizing equilibrium. Indeed, a
single round of elimination eliminates all outcomes not on the diagonal, be-
cause the maximum worst gain when picking the lowest price is the lowest
price divided by the number of players. The worst gain on all other strategies
is zero. Since all strategies outside the diagonal involve 0 for some player, they
are all eliminated. A second round of elimination only retains the welfare-
maximizing equilibrium. The PTE thus also explains full cooperation on this
game.
6.4 Traveler’s dilemma
Another example of game by Capraro and Halpern (2015) is the Traveler’s
dilemma game. Two traveler’s who lost their luggage can ask for a compen-
sation. If they both ask for the same amount, they get it. Otherwise, the one
who asked for the lowest amount get it with a bonus, and the other gets that
same lowest amount with the bonus deducted as a penalty. Figure 9 shows an
instance of its game solved for its (existing) PTE.
The Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium coincides with both players picking
the highest compensation number. Indeed, the maximum worst case is the
lowest price, because all other strategies let to a worst-case scenario of the
lowest price minus the penalty. In the second round, the maximum worst case
becomes the next lowest price, and so on, until the maximum price is the only
one left for both players. The PTE thus also explains full cooperation on this
game.
6.5 An asymmetric social dilemma
All social dilemmas described by Capraro and Halpern (2015) are symmetric
games. The PTE solves them by providing counterfactual structures based on
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2 3 4
2 2, 2 3, 1 3, 1
3 1, 3 3, 3 4, 2
3 1, 3 2, 4 4, 4
⇒
2 3 4
2 2, 2 3, 1 3, 1
3 1, 3 3, 3 4, 2
3 1, 3 2, 4 4, 4
⇒
2 3 4
2 2, 2 3, 1 3, 1
3 1, 3 3, 3 4, 2
3 1, 3 2, 4 4, 4
⇒
2 3 4
2 2, 2 3, 1 3, 1
3 1, 3 3, 3 4, 2
3 1, 3 2, 4 4, 4
Fig. 9 The Traveler’s dilemma game with two players with prices settable to 2, 3 or 4and a
bonus/penalty of 2. The PTE coincides with the welfare-maximizing equilibrium. The Nash
equilibrium is, however, (2,2).
A B C
D 6, 8 1, 2 4, 4
E 3, 1 0, 7 2, 3
F 7, 0 8, 5 5, 6
⇒
A B C
D 6, 8 1, 2 4, 4
E 3, 1 0, 7 2, 3
F 7, 0 8, 5 5, 6
⇒
A B C
D 6, 8 1, 2 4, 4
E 3, 1 0, 7 2, 3
F 7, 0 8, 5 5, 6
Fig. 10 An asymmetric social dilemma: the PTE coincides with the welfare-maximizing
profile. The Nash equilibrium, (5, 6), is Pareto-dominated by the PTE.
Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies that lead to a
unique outcome: the welfare-maximizing profile. The Hofstadter equilibrium
also explains this same profile with the symmetric diagonal argument.
But the definition of a social dilemma given by Capraro and Halpern (2015)
does not require in general symmetry. Figure 10 shows an asymmetric social
dilemma, with the iterative deletion procedure of the PTE made explicit. This
game was found with a filtering query on a sampled dataset of games by Felipe
Sulser (2019) during his Master’s thesis. We can see that the PTE solves this
asymmetric social dilemma.
Note, however, that it is not always the case that the PTE Pareto-improves
a Nash equilibrium. There are thus social dilemma in which the PTE is Pareto-
optimal, but does not Pareto-dominate the Nash equilibrium.
7 Literature and related work on non-Nashian game theory
There is a growing literature of solution concepts in non-Nashian Game The-
ory. They all have in common the change in assumption: while in the Nash
paradigm, the opponent’s strategies are held fixed while optimizing one’s util-
ity, this line of research assumes that there may be a counterfactual depen-
dency between the agent’s decisions.
It is important to understand that the non-Nashian line of reasoning is not
Evidential Decision Theory as explained in Section 3. Indeed, the reasoning
involves potentially asymmetric counterfactual dependencies, expressed in En-
glish as as subjunctive conditionals, while EDT uses conditional probabilities.
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As a rule of thumb, there are two main categories of non-Nashian ap-
proaches
The first approach is found for example in Halpern and Pass (2018), who
coined it as “translucent”. While they drop the Nash assumption that op-
ponent strategies are counterfactually independent from a player’s choice of
strategy, they assume a weaker version of rationality than Necessary Rational-
ity. They call this weaker version Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality,
as we will see shortly.
The other approach, which is the one taken in this paper, is fully trans-
parent. It not only drops the Nash assumption that opponent strategies are
counterfactually independent from a player’s choice of strategy, but replaces
it with different assumptions regarding the counterfactuals: namely, that even
if a player had picked a different strategy, both players would still have been
rational and would still have known the outcome of the game.
Translucency has, overall, a tendency to Pareto-improve Nash equillibria
(for strong solution concepts such as Shiffrin’s), or to subsume Nash equilib-
ria20 (for weaker concepts such as Halpern’s and Pass’s minimax-Rationalizability).
The fully transparent approach is more orthogonal and sometimes coin-
cides with a Nash equilibrium, sometimes Pareto-improves a Nash equilibrium,
sometimes has no Pareto relationship with the Nash equillibrium (some agents
get more, some less).
7.1 Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality and Minimax
Rationalizability (Non-Nashian, translucent)
A classical assumption made in game theory is Common Belief (or Knowl-
edge)21 of Rationality: all players are rational, and believe (or know) that
they all are, and believe that they all believe that they all are, and so on. In
other words, common knowledge of rationality is assumed in the actual world.
In non-Nashian Game theory, rationality is also counterfactually assumed.
In this paper, we assume the strongest criteria of Necessary Rationality: in
any possible worlds, all players are rational. Necessary Rationality implies
Common Knowledge of Rationality, but the converse is not true: Common
Knowledge of Rationality does not imply that rationality also holds counter-
factually, that is, that rationality would still hold if the agents made different
decisions.
20 This is only a conjecture formulated in vague wording at this point, i.e., that non-
fully-transparent translucency either subsumes or Pareto-improves Nashian results, and full
transparency behaves like a singularity where Nashian results no longer apply, and the
outcomes suddenly diverge from non-fully-transparent translucency. From a modal logics
perspective, the difference lies in the presence of impossible possible worlds (Rantala, 1982)
due to the strong assumption of epistemic omniscience in all possible worlds, used to model
full transparency.
21 In epistemic logics, the difference is that a player can believe that an event holds even
it does not. Knowledge is thus a stronger assumption than belief.
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Joseph Halpern and Rafael Pass explicitly name—and formally define—the
weaker assumption of Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality (CCBR).
Firstly, CCBR means that all players are rational. Secondly, it means that
each one of them counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational, which
means that they believe that, even if an agent had acted differently, all other
agents would have been rational. This is where it is weaker: Necessary Ratio-
nality more strongly implies that, if an agent had acted differently, all agents
including him/her would have been rational. Finally CCBR also recursively
means that all agents counterfactually believes that everyone else counterfac-
tually believes that everyone else is rational, and so on.
As is done in this paper, CCBR does not assume that the opponents’
strategies would be unchanged if a player unilaterally changed his strategy.
Dropping this assumption leaves room for alternate assumptions, in their case
CCBR. Halpern and Pass make no particular assumptions regarding Perfect
Prediction, which we do in this paper.
Halpern and Pass define minimax rationalizability to select strategies that
make sense under CCBR. The algorithmic characterization of minimax ratio-
nalizability is by iterated deletion of strategies that are minimax dominated.
Informally, in a game in normal form, a strategy of player i is minimax
dominated if there exists another strategy that guarantees him a higher payoff
no matter what the opposite player does or would do. In other words, there is
another strategy for which the minimum payoff is greater than the maximum
payoff of the dominated strategy.
The intuition behind this definition is that, even if the player considers
that the opponent’s strategy is counterfactually dependent on his choice, a
minimax-dominated strategy will never be a good choice as the payoffs will
nevertheless always be less, no matter what the assumed counterfactual de-
pendency is. If a player P picked a minimax-dominated strategy, even if the
opponent’s strategy is the best possible case for P, there is another strategy
that would give him a higher payoff even if the (then possibly different) oppo-
nent’s strategy were the worst possible case.
This is to be put in contrast with “classical” rationalizability, in which
strategies which are not best responses are eliminated, which is a weaker re-
quirement for elimination. In other words, a strategy that is minimax-dominated
would also be eliminated according to classical rationalizability.
Figure 11 shows an example of game in which some strategies are minimax-
dominated and can thus be eliminated under CCBR. It can seen on these games
that less outcomes are eliminated than with classical rationalizability. Indeed,
with A and D eliminated, E, which is minimax-rationalizable, is never a best
response, which makes it non-rationalizable. If we drop unilateral deviations,
then CE may still be reasonable if the column player believes that, if she had
picked F (and this leaked), the row player would have picked B: 8 > 7. This
is something that cannot be captured with unilateral deviations in Causal
Decision Theory.
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D E F
A 1,5 2,3 4,1
B 3,2 6,6 9,7
C 5,4 7,8 8,9
⇒
D E F
A 1,5 2,3 4,1
B 3,2 6,6 9,7
C 5,4 7,8 8,9
⇒
D E F
A 1,5 2,3 4,1
B 3,2 6,6 9,7
C 5,4 7,8 8,9
Fig. 11 A 3x3 game in normal form, for which strategy A is minimax-dominated by both
C, and (after eliminating C) D is minimax-dominated by either E or F. The iteration goes
from left to right, and eliminated profiles are marked in black. A and D are not minimax-
rationalizable, in other words, are not rational according to CCBR, even if each player
considers the strategy of the other player not to be fixed. Strategy profiles marked in black
are also not rationalizable. Those marked in light gray are minimax-rationalizable, but not
rationalizable.
Definition 7 (minimax rationalizability) : Given a game (P,Σ, u), given
a player i, a strategy σi is minimax-dominated
22 if
∃υi ∈ Σi, min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(υi, τ−i) > max
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σi, τ−i)
Joseph Halpern and Rafael Pass give alternate characterizations of minimax-
rationalizability, but iterated deletion is the most intuitive one, and the one
that we will use for our proof.
The concept of minimax-rationalizability, defined on strategies, extends
to strategy profiles, i.e., a strategy profile can be considered to be minimax-
rationalizable if all the strategies it is made of are all minimax-rationalizable.
A strong feature of minimax-rationalizability is that the result is indepen-
dent of the order in which strategies are eliminated. The cost to pay is that
it is a weak criterion in the sense that for many games, most strategies are
minimax-rationalizable. For example, the games shown on Figures 3, 14 and 15
have no minimax-dominated strategies. The PTE is a strong criterion because
it is at most unique. However, it requires that the outcomes are eliminated
in successive steps, which means that there is an underlying structure in the
(counterfactual) levels of logical omniscience as the reasoning progresses. This
is formalized in details in Fourny (2018) where it is conjectured in particular
that necessary logical omniscience, necessary rationality and necessary knowl-
edge of strategies form an impossibility triangle. In the framework of perfect
prediction, the logical reasoning needs to be bootstrapped starting with the
entire set of outcomes, which is formally achieved with non-normal-worlds
(Rantala, 1982) in which anything is possible and nothing is necessary.
A counterexample was obtained by running the computations on a large
number of games. No counterexample was found on 2 × 2 games. Among 12
million 3 × 3 games tried out23, 9 million had a PTE, and a bit more than
8000 was not minimax-rationalizable, which is less than 0.1%.
22 In the original paper (Halpern and Pass, 2018), the opponent’s strategy is taken from
a subset of the opponent’s strategies to account for successive eliminations. We are leaving
out this aspect here for pedagogical reasons. Indeed, one can also mentally update Σ in
place as strategies get eliminated.
23 This is only a small subset of the entire space of 3× 3 games
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D E F
A 1, 1 2, 2 3, 4
B 4, 5 6, 8 7, 9
C 5, 6 8, 3 9, 7
⇒
D E F
A 1, 1 2, 2 3, 4
B 4, 5 6, 8 7, 9
C 5, 6 8, 3 9, 7
⇒
⇒
D E F
A 1, 1 2, 2 3, 4
B 4, 5 6, 8 7, 9
C 5, 6 8, 3 9, 7
⇒
D E F
A 1, 1 2, 2 3, 4
B 4, 5 6, 8 7, 9
C 5, 6 8, 3 9, 7
Fig. 12 An example of game in which the PTE is not minimax-rationalizable. We show
the iterated elimination of profiles towards the PTE.
D E F
A 1, 1 2, 2 3, 4
B 4, 5 6, 8 7, 9
C 5, 6 8, 3 9, 7
⇒
D E F
A 1, 1 2, 2 3, 4
B 4, 5 6, 8 7, 9
C 5, 6 8, 3 9, 7
⇒
⇒
D E F
A 1, 1 2, 2 3, 4
B 4, 5 6, 8 7, 9
C 5, 6 8, 3 9, 7
⇒
D E F
A 1, 1 2, 2 3, 4
B 4, 5 6, 8 7, 9
C 5, 6 8, 3 9, 7
⇒
D E F
A 1, 1 2, 2 3, 4
B 4, 5 6, 8 7, 9
C 5, 6 8, 3 9, 7
Fig. 13 An example of game in which the PTE is not minimax-rationalizable. We show
the iterated elimination of strategies that are not minimax-rationalizable.
This counterexample is shown on Figures 12 and 13, with both solution
concepts are shown. Part of the reason is that minimax rationalizability elimi-
nates strategies (rows and columns), while necessary rationality and Necessary
Knowledge of Strategies eliminate strategy profiles (single outcomes).
Minimax-rationalizability is based on iterated elimination of strategies,
which is also indirectly iterated elimination of strategy profiles, but in en-
tire row or column batches. While it is true that all strategy profiles that get
eliminated in the first round in minimax-rationalizability are also eliminated
in the first round in the PTE, the converse is not true and further rounds may
start to deviate, converging to different final sets. Figure 13 gives the rounds
of elimination of strategies that are not minimax-rationalizable for the same
game. We can see that only C and F are minimax-rationalizable, leaving only
CF under CCBR
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A closer look shows that the order in which we eliminate strategy profiles in
the successive rounds matters: a strategy profile that the PTE eliminates in the
first round cannot be used for further preemption. It is thus important in the
PTE that, at each round, all strategy profiles that are known to be inconsistent
with Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies must be
eliminated, using all the knowledge on impossible profiles available from the
previous round: otherwise, a non-eliminated strategy profile may mistakenly
affect (upwards) the maximin utility, eliminating strategy profiles that should
not be eliminated.
This shows that, under CCBR, which is the translucent case, there is some
opacity: in the third round of elimination, on Figure 13, B is eliminated be-
cause 6 and 7 are both below the surviving 8 and 9. However, in the case
of Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies, the players
commonly know in all possible worlds that CE, which is not individually ra-
tional, is not possible. Likewise, they commonly know in all possible worlds
that, since AE is not individually rational either, then in any possible worlds in
which the column player picks E, the row player picks B. With this knowledge,
obtained after two rounds of reasoning under Necessary Rationality and Nec-
essary Knowledge of Strategies, CF is eliminated as well, as the column player
would deviate to E to get 8 instead of 7. Strategy C thus is never picked in any
possible world, and cannot be used to argue that strategy B is not possible.
This means that there is some singularity between a translucent setting,
and a fully transparent setting in which extra knowledge can be used to elim-
inate single profiles rather than strategies as a whole.
This singularity does not exist for symmetric games, as we will see in Sec-
tion 8. Indeed, on symmetric games, any PTE is always minimax-rationalizable.
Halpern and Pass also include a discussion of individual rationality of strat-
egy profiles, as also introduced in Section 2.3, which shows that it is relevant
not only in the Nashian paradigm as known from the Folk theorems, but also
to non-Nashian reasoning.
Minimax-rationalizability and individual rationality, for strategy profiles,
are not subsuming each other in any way: an individually rational strategy
profile may not survive iterated minimax-deletion, and not all strategy profiles
that survive it are individually rational. As Halpern and Pass point out, an
individually rational strategy profile will always survive the first round of
minimax elimination, but may get eliminated in the second. The intuitive
reason is that, after a round of elimination, this strategy profile may “lose” its
individual rationality because the elimination of some strategies can increase
the threshold required for individual rationality.
7.2 Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (Non-Nashian, transparent)
The counterpart of the PTE on extensive form with perfect information was
published by Fourny et al (2018), with the same assumptions of Necessary
Knowledge of Strategies and Necessary Rationality (even though the termi-
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nology in this older paper may be different). It is also known as the Projected
Equilibrium, which was the initial named used by Jean-Pierre Dupuy. The
PPE is the natural counterpart of the PTE for games in extensive form. It
has many features in common. First, it is based on an iterated elimination of
preempted outcomes. Preemption is also done using the minimum guaranteed
payoff by the strategy or move used to deviate. Like the PTE, the PPE is
unique and Pareto-optimal.
However, the PPE differs from the PTE in that it always exists, and must
solve Grandfather’s paradoxes. In particular, given a game in extensive form
and its PPE, if we convert the game to a normal form as is done in Nashian
game theory, the PTE of this converted normal form will not always match the
PPE. This is because the normal form does not carry the causal dependencies
of the extensive forms. While these causal dependencies are not needed in the
Nash equilibrium (because the past is counterfactually independent from the
future), they are paramount in Perfect Prediction settings: the consistency of
the game timeline must be preserved and the successive choices of the players
must cause24 each other: a decision cannot be made at a node n if the player
playing at the parent node did not pick n.
7.3 Superrationality (Non-Nashian, transparent)
Hofstadter (1983) defined superrational equilibria on symmetric games in nor-
mal form. Superrationality is discussed in Section 8.2 on symmetric games.
7.4 Shiffrin’s Joint-Selfish-Rational equilibrium (Non-Nashian, translucent)
Shiffrin et al (2009) suggest an alternate approach for the discovery of Pareto
optima in extensive form games, the Joint-Selfish-Rational equilibrium (JSRE).
The approach differs from the PPE (Fourny et al, 2018) and PTE (this paper),
in that outcomes that have been eliminated can still be considered as devi-
ations in subsequent rounds. The JSRE reasoning starts with the Subgame-
Perfect Equilibrium, and navigates up and down the tree finding Pareto op-
timizations of successive interim equilibria. This leads to the same solution
as the PPE in many games, but diverges from the PPE on other games. The
JSRE in its original form is explained on several examples and has been for-
malized in pseudo-code by Felipe Sulser (2019) in the general case. It has an
exponential complexity to calculate as the number of players increases. The
JSRE is currently undergoing a redesign by Rich Shiffrin to account for use
cases in which the predicted equilibrium was not fully satisfactory in practice.
We believe that the divergence between the PPE and the JSRE paradigm
is due to a fundamental axiomatic disagreement, in that the PPE reasoning
(like the PTE reasoning) is based on the absence of contingencies, due to the
24 in the sense that the former do not preempt the latter. In relativistic terms, we think
of causality in the sense of inclusion in the future light cone.
38 Ghislain Fourny
uniqueness of the equilibrium, and on reasonings only on the equilibrium path.
The JSRE uses counterfactual implications outside the equilibrium path as the
SPE does, which we believe make it prone to the Backward Induction Paradox.
7.5 Program Equilibrium (Non-Nashian, translucent)
Tennenholtz (2004) introduces the concept of an equilibrium in normal form,
the Program Equilibrium, in which the players provide computer programs
instead of strategies. The programs can read each other’s source code, which
means that the computations are transparent to each other. This is increasingly
relevant in the context of smart contracts and, for example, the Ethereum
blockchain, where smart contracts can look at each other. They show that any
individual outcome can be obtained with this setup.
A crucial difference with the PTE is that, in the Program Equilibrium, the
programs can read each other and deviate to a punishment in case they are
not identical, however there is no concept to enforce that the programs would
also have been the same if they had picked a different strategy. In the PTE,
there is Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies, which
means that the programs should be transparent to each other not only in the
actual world, but in all possible worlds.
For any game, the Program Equilibria are the individually rational out-
comes, which are also known to be obtained as steady states of repeated games
(Folk theorem).
It remains an open avenue of research how the Program Equilibrium can
be adapted to give a setup that exactly matches the transparency assumptions
described in this paper.
7.6 Second-Order Nash Equilibrium (Non-Nashian, translucent)
Bilo` and Flammini (2011) introduces the concept of Second-Order Nash Equi-
librium. Like the PTE, they are interested in one-shot games as opposed to
repeated games. They extend the set of equilibria to a superset of Nash equi-
llibria, making it a bigger set of candidate outcomes and a weaker condition,
as are individual rationality, rationalizability or minimax-rationalizability.
Put simply, Second-Order Nash Equilibria differ from the PTE in that de-
viations are made sequentially in the actual world, as opposed to counterfactu-
ally as hypothetical alternatives. Indeed, while Second-Order Nash Equilibria
model the consequences of a deviation of strategy in terms of a number of im-
proving steps leading eventually to a Nash equillibrium that may or may not
improve an agent’s payoff, the PTE formally models deviations of strategies
into a recursive structure of Lewisian closest-state functions, as is also done
for minimax-rationalizability, but with the players being rational and making
correct predictions in all states.
The PTE, as opposed to Second-Order Nash Equilibra, shows that in a
fully transparent setting, the laws of logics dictate that at most one outcome
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can be reached. It is thus a stronger condition. There is no known relation
of inclusion between the two concepts as of today, and we suspect that there
might be counter-examples.
7.7 Stalnaker-Bonanno equilibrium (Nashian)
The PTE distinguishes itself from other solution concepts such as minimax-
rationalizability, in that it iteratively eliminates single strategy profiles rather
than entire strategies.
As it turns out, there are other examples of solution concepts that eliminate
individual profiles, including in Nashian literature. A prominent example was
originally formulated by Stalnaker (1994) in the presence of Common Belief
of Rationality, as well as the assumption that what is believed is actually true
(but not recursively). This leads to a slightly stronger definition of rationality,
in which it is considered irrational, given a specific opponent’s decision σ−i,
to play a strategy σi that is weakly dominated by another strategy (smaller-
or-equal payoffs), and such that for that one specific opponent’s decision, the
inequality is strict. This eliminates specifically the unoptimal profile (σi, σ−i),
but not the entire strategy σi. The process is iterated until it converges to a
set of remaining profiles. Bonanno (2008) gave a syntactic characterization of
this solution concept to complement Stalnaker’s work.
This equilibrium concept differs from the PTE, because payoff compar-
isons are done by fixing the opponent’s strategy (weak domination of strate-
gies), which is the Nashian free choice assumption where decisions are taken
independently of each other.
7.8 Perfect Cooperative Equilibrium (Non-Nashian, translucent)
The Perfect Cooperative Equilibrium (PCE) was introduced by Rong and
Halpern (2014) to address social dilemmas. It is defined on games in normal
form for any number of players. It is based on a “maximax” approach in that
one computes the best possible payoff, under the constraint that the opponents
are best-responding. All strategy profiles that Pareto-dominate the obtained
payoffs are PCE. A PCE always Pareto-dominates all Nash equilibria.
The Perfect Cooperative Equilibrium is designed in the context of repeated
games in which players “best respond to what they have learned”, i.e., the
idea is that the two agents can converge to a Perfect Cooperative Equilibrium
rather than to a Nash Equilibrium.
Rong and Halpern (2014) also introduce variants such as the M-PCE, where
the threshold above which a PCE is obtained is offset by the same, maxi-
mum possible amount – possible negative – for all players until exactly one
remains. Cooperative Equilibria (CE) are also defined for two-player games
with a slightly weaker condition than the PCE.
It is worth noting that, in the case of a zero-sum game with two players, the
PCE coincides with individual rationality, because maximizing the opponent’s
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payoff (anticipating their best response) is identical to minimizing one’s own
payoff (considering the worst case scenario).
7.9 Translucent equilibrium (Non-Nashian, translucent)
The translucent equilibrium was introduced in Capraro and Halpern (2015)
as a weak solution concept that captures translucency.
Translucent equilibria are algorithmically obtained, for pure strategies25,
as those that Pareto-dominate the tuple of second-lowest “minimin”, in a
single round of elimination. In other words, an agent considers the worst-case
scenario for each one of his strategies. She then looks at the obtained payoffs,
and looks at the second-lowest. Any strategy profiles that yield a payoff below
this threshold to this agent are eliminated.
This is thus similar to individual rationality, but with the second-lowest
minimum rather than the maximum. For this reason, in a pure strategy set-
ting, an individually rational strategy profile is also a translucent equilibrium
because the threshold is stricter.
A Nash equillibrium is always translucent, and the PTE is also always
translucent, because it is always individually rational. The Translucent equi-
librium is thus the lowest known common denominator between the PTE and
the Nash equilibrium.
7.10 Correlated equilibrium (Nashian)
A common question asked about the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium, where
the agents’ decisions may be counterfactually dependent on each other, is how
this relates to the correlated equilibrium.
A correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) (Aumann, 1987) is a generaliza-
tion (superset) of the Nash equilibrium. The agents receive, in advance, signals
from a source, and these signals may be correlated. In practice, a signal often
consists of a strategy profile that serves as a synchronization mechanism to
“agree” on a specific Nash equilibrium.
A correlated equilibrium consists in a probability distribution on possible
worlds26 (actually called states by the community), a partition of this set of
possible worlds for each player that models their knowledge, and an assign-
ment of a choice of strategy for each possible partition. It is an equilibrium
if the expected utility is more than if the agents unilaterally modified their
assignment of strategies to partitions.
From this definition, it is straightforward that correlated equilibria are
part of the Nashian paradigm: changes of the assignments of strategies to
25 Capraro and Halpern actually define it also on mixed strategies
26 Please see Section 3.3 for a beginner’s introduction to possible worlds, accessibility
relations, the modelling of knowledge or belief, and partitions as a special case of accessibility
relation when the relation is transitive, reflexive and symmetric.
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partitions are done unilaterally, i.e., in spite of the correlation in the state of
nature (which induces a correlation in the decisions, seen as random variables),
the assignments of strategies are chosen independently of each other.
Correlated equilibrium can be used to fine-tune cases in which there may
exists several Nash equilibrium (e.g., in the Battle of the Sexes game), as the
signal can be used to synchronize on one of the Nash equilibria.
7.11 Quantum games (Nashian)
In this paper, we are interested in games in normal form and look at pure
strategies, i.e., players pick a single strategy. The Nash paradigm also allows
mixed strategies, in which players may instead pick a probability distribution
over their sets of strategies. In correlated equilibria, these probability distri-
butions may be built on top of (possibly correlated) signals received by all
agents before the game, which allows synchronization.
Quantum games Meyer (1999) Benjamin and Hayden (2001) are a further
extension this paradigm, in which players receive the signal from nature as a
quantum state, and can also send their choice of strategy as quantum states
(qubits) rather than classical states (i.e., classical probability distributions
over sequences of bits for mixed strategies). There is a considerable body
of literature on Bell inequalities Bell (1964)Colbeck (2017) that shows that
the expressive power of qubits is strictly greater than that of classical bits,
because of entanglements in the received signals (also quantum states) that
allow breaking constraints that limit what classical bits can do.
The choices of strategies in quantum games by the agents correspond on the
physical level to the application of unitary (reversible) transformations to their
input quantum states, to the free choice of measurement axes, and to carrying
out the corresponding measurements. Again, these choices, especially picking
measurement axes, are again governed in this paradigm by the assumption
that they are made fully independently from anything that could not have
been caused by them27.
We are actively investigating an alternate avenue of research, available
publicly as pre-prints, in which we drop this assumption of independence by
applying NNDT to quantum theory. For this, we generalized the PTE to de-
cisions made in special-relativistic spacetime, which are shown to be express-
able as games in extensive form with imperfect information (Fourny, 2019b).
We then reformulated measurements and experiments as games played across
spacetime between agents (physicists) and nature, which also maximizes its
utility (this is known as the Principle of Least Action) (Fourny, 2019a). This
leads to completely deterministic models based on pure strategies that offer
the potential to extend quantum theory to a fully deterministic (and falsifi-
able) theory without being constrained by the Bell inequalities and without
27 This elegant formal formulation is by (Renner and Colbeck, 2011)
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contradicting theoretical impossibility theorems28, with the long-term goal of
yielding concrete experimental protocols and possibly more powerful, fixed-
point-based computational models Aaronson and Watrous (2008). Because we
use NNDT and not CDT, this approach is different than that taken in quan-
tum games, which remains Nashian in nature as far as the agents’ decisions
on measurement axes are concerned.
8 The special case of symmetric games
There is a subclass of games that is of particular relevance, because play-
ers are interchangeable: symmetric games. Symmetric games are the cate-
gory of games for which the earliest accounts of non-Nashian reasonings are
found in literature Hofstadter (1983). They are thus of particular impor-
tance for comparisons with more recent non-Nashian results such as minimax-
rationalizability and the PTE, but also with the older concept of individual
rationality (Folk theorem).
8.1 Symmetric games
In a symmetric game, the strategy spaces are identical for all players, and
the payoffs are defined in such a way that the game is invariant through a
permutation of players.
Definition 8 (symmetric game) A game is symmetric if
– the strategy spaces are identical
∀i, j ∈ P,Σi = Σj = Υ
– the payoffs are symmetric
∀pi ∈ Sym[P ],∀σ ∈ Σ, ui(σ) = upi(i)(σpi(.))
where Sym[P ] is the permutation group on P and σpi(.) denotes (σpi(1),
σpi(2), ..., σpi(|P |)).
The prisoner dilemma (Figure 3) is the most prominent symmetric game,
found in almost any text book of game theory. Other prominent symmetric
game examples are the Chicken game (Figure 14), the Coordination game
(Figure 15). Figure 16 finally shows an example of 3x3 game in general position.
On all these figures, the Nash equilibrium and individually rational outcomes
(which include Nash equilibria) are shown in black resp. gray.
28 These theorems all rely on Nashian models of decision making. The most stringent such
impossibility theorem currently known to us, by Renner and Colbeck (2011) shows that
quantum theory is maximally informative (and thus nature is inherently random) for agents
endowed with free choice in the Nash sense (unilateral deviations).
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Straight Swerve
Straight 0, 0 3, 1
Swerve 1, 3 2, 2
Fig. 14 The chicken game. A player can either stay straight or swerve. If both swerve, they
get more (aka lose less) than if they both stay straight, and a player who unilaterally goes
straight gets more payoff than if both swerve. The difference with the prisoner’s dilemma,
however, is that the ”betrayed” player has interest in not reciprocating the betrayal (0 and 1
are swapped). This game has two Nash equilibria: when players make opposite decisions.The
individually rational outcomes are all those that Pareto-dominate the maximin tuple (1,1),
that is, all but Straight-Straight.
Sushi Pizza
Sushi 1, 1 0,0
Pizza 0,0 2,2
Fig. 15 The coordination game. In this game, the players have a mutual interest to pick
the same strategy, even though one of the two strategies is better for both of them (aligned
interest). All diagonal outcomes are Nash equilibria, i.e., players will not deviate if they made
the same decision.The individually rational outcomes are all those that Pareto-dominate the
maximin tuple (0,0), that is all of them.
A B C
A 9, 9 8,6 5,1
B 6,8 7,7 4,2
C 1,5 2,4 3,3
Fig. 16 A larger game. The Nash equilibrium is AD, i.e., (9,9). The individually rational
outcomes are all those that Pareto-dominate the maximin tuple (5,5). Indeed, strategy A
guarantees for both players a minimum payoff of 5 regardless of what the other does.
8.2 Superrationality
Superrationality was introduced by Douglas Hofstadter in 1983 for symmetric
strategic games in a Scientific American column.
Hofstadter’s argument was made in the introduction (Section 1.1), where
we quoted one of his most brilliant explanations. It appears straightaway that
Douglas Hofstadter was directly putting in question the fundamental assump-
tion behind Nash equilibria that players consider their decisions to be coun-
terfactually independent from other players’ decisions. Superrational players
consider that their reasonings are interdependent, not because of any causal
effect or any kind of retrocausality, but because their reasonings and conclu-
sions are identical. As argued in Section 3, an agent’s decision may not be mere
evidence of the other agent’s decision (this is what Evidential Decision Theory
argues): there can be an actual counterfactual implication between the agents’
decisions under a weakened free choice assumption (a form of reasoning that
we called Non-Nashian Decision Theory).
The games described in Hofstadter’s column are all symmetric, which is a
requirement for the reasonings to be identical. Identical reasonings and con-
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Defect Cooperate
Defect 1, 1 3, 0
Cooperate 0, 3 2, 2
Fig. 17 The prisoner’s dilemma. Superrational players either both cooperate or both devi-
ate. In a Hofstadter equilibrium, players both cooperate.
Straight Swerve
Straight 0, 0 3, 1
Swerve 1, 3 2, 2
Fig. 18 The chicken game. Superrational players either both stay straight or swerve. In a
Hofstadter equilibrium, players both swerve.
clusions mean that only outcomes on the diagonal of the normal form are
considered. An equilibrium is reached if among all outcomes of the diagonal,
it leads to the highest payoffs (which does not depend on the player as the
game is symmetric).29
Formally, this is expressed as follows.
Definition 9 (Hofstadter equilibrium) Given a symmetric game Γ =
(P, (Σi)i, (ui)i) in normal form, a strategy profile
−→σ is an equilibrium reached
by Superrational players (a Hofstadter equilibrium) if:
– the strategy profile is on the diagonal:
∃υ ∈ Υ,−→σ = (υ, υ, ..., υ)
which we can also express as
−→σ ∈ diag(Σ)
– it maximizes the payoff on the diagonal
∀−→τ ∈ diag(Σ),∀i ∈ P, ui(−→σ ) ≥ ui(−→τ )
We are unsure of how Hofstadter would describe Superrational behavior in
games with ties, as several equilibria may emerge, contradicting the premise
of the reasoning. However, in this paper, we assume that games have no ties
so that the Hofstadter equilibrium exists and is unique.
Figures 17, 18 and 19 show the Hofstadter equilibria for our example games.
An alternate formalization of Hofstadter’s superrationality on symmetric
games is given by Tohme´ and Viglizzo (2019), called superrational types. Types
29 Note that the original paper by Douglas Hofstadter defines the equilibrium reached by
superrational players for variants of the prisoner’s dilemma. We are taking the liberty of
formally extending the reasoning on any symmetric games. However, it has to be said that
we are unsure of what Douglas Hofstadter would think of games with ties on the diagonal,
as there would not be a unique solution.
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Sushi Pizza
Sushi 1, 1 0,0
Pizza 0,0 2,2
Fig. 19 The coordination game. Superrational players either both pick Sushi or Pizza. In
a Hofstadter equilibrium, players both pick Pizza.
model beliefs that agents have on the types and decisions of other agents. Su-
perrational types correspond to cases were the type and action of any agent
are perfectly correlated with the types and actions the agent believes other
agents have30. In this respect, to the best of our understanding, this approach
is explicitly Bayesian, does not rely on counterfactuals, and is an EDT ac-
count of superrationality, whereas our approach is Non-Nashian and based on
(possibly non-symmetric) probabilities of subjunctive conditionals (counter-
factuals). This paper shows that an NNDT approach is the key to extending
superrationality to non-symmetric games.
8.3 Inclusion theorems specific to symmetric games
We now turn to inclusion theorems involving Hofstadter’s Superrationality,
minimax-rationalizability, individual rationality and the Perfectly Transparent
Equilibrium. These theorems are proven here, and the proofs are relatively
succinct. These results were also confirmed experimentally on a very large
quantity of games of various sizes by Felipe Sulser (2019), with the datasets
publicly available online, including the game configurations annotated with
their resolution to various equilibrium concepts.
We give the inclusion theorems in this order, which is summarized on Figure
20.
– PTE ⊂ Hofstadter equilibrium
– Hofstadter equilibrium ⊂ minimax-rationalizability
– Hofstadter equilibrium ⊂ individual rationality
Interestingly, it follows by transitivity that, on symmetric games, the PTE,
when it exists, is always minimax-rationalizable. This is not true in general
for asymmetric games, as we will see in Section 9
Theorem 3 (PTE ⊂ Hofstadter equilibrium) Given a symmetric game
in normal form, with pure strategies and with no ties, if the Perfect Prediction
Equilibrium exists, then it is identical to Hofstadter’s equilibrium.
Proof (PTE ⊂ Hofstadter equilibrium) Assume the PTE exists for a given
game. In a symmetric game, the PTE must be on the diagonal. This is because,
if the PTE were not on the diagonal, one would obtain another distinct PTE
30 The authors also analyze the case were agents may have different type spaces, in which
case identifications are made to fall back to symmetric type spaces.
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Fig. 20 A diagram depicting the relationship between the Translucent Equilibrium, Mini-
max Rationalizability, Individual Rationality, Superrationality and the Perfectly Transpar-
ent Equilibrium for strategy profiles on symmetric games.
by swapping the role of the players. This would contradict uniqueness. Thus,
the PTE lies on the diagonal. Since it must be Pareto-optimal, it must be
correspond to the maximum diagonal payoff and coincide with the Hofstadter
equillibrium, as non-maximum diagonal payoffs are Pareto-dominated by the
Hofstadter equillibrium. 
Even though it reaches the same conclusion on symmetric games, the
PTE tells a different story than Superrationality in its original form. Even
though non-diagonal outcomes are all eliminated (not because of their non-
diagonalness, but for other arguments), the decision remains a strategic deci-
sion: cooperate or defect in the prisoner’s dilemma. Given a decision (in some
given possible world), the payoff obtained must be compared to the counter-
factual payoffs obtained if the other decision had been made (which it could,
counterfactually). This counterfactual structure leads to the conclusion that
cooperating is the rational choice (2¿1) in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Theorem 4 (Hofstadter equilibrium ⊂minimax-rationalizability) Given
a symmetric game in normal form, a Hofstadter equilibrium is always minimax-
rationalizable.
Proof (Hofstadter equilibrium ⊂ minimax-rationalizability)
In minimax rationalizability, the order of elimination is not relevant. Be-
cause of symmetry, if a strategy gets eliminated for a player, then it will be
eliminated for all players. We reorder eliminations in such a way that strate-
gies get eliminated for all players in batches, so that after each elimination,
the game remains symmetric. We can now show that, for a symmetric game,
a Hofstadter equilibrium cannot get minimax-eliminated.
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Let −→σ be a Hofstadter equilibrium. We can write it as −→σ = (σ, σ, ..., σ) for
some σ ∈ Υ .
By definition of the maximum:
max
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σ, τ−i) ≥ ui(σ, σ, ..., σ)
because (σ, ..., σ) is in the set over which the maximum is taken (opponents’
strategies).
Let now i denote a player, and υ ∈ Υ now be any of its strategies.
By definition of a Hofstadter equilibrium, the payoffs are maximal on the
diagonal, so that:
ui(σ, σ, ..., σ) ≥ ui(υ, υ, ..., υ)
Finally, by definition of the minimum:
ui(υ, υ, ..., υ) ≥ min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(υ, τ−i)
because (σ, ..., σ) is in the set over which the maximum is taken (opponents’
strategies).
By transitivity, we get:
max
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σ, τ−i) ≥ min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(υ, τ−i)
which directly contradicts the existence of a strategy that allows minimax-
domination, and this holds for any player.
There is one more thing to say for the proof to be complete. After an
iteration of deletion of minimax-dominated strategies as described above, a
Hofstadter equilibrium remains a Hofstadter equilibrium. This is because elim-
inating other rows or columns than that of the maximum diagonal payoff does
not affect this maximum diagonal payoff. Hence, a Hofstadter equilibrium will
recursively survive all iterations and, in the end, satisfy minimax rationaliz-
ability. 
Theorem 5 (Hofstadter equilibrium ⊂ individual rationality) Given
a symmetric game in normal form, a Hofstadter equilibrium is always individ-
ually rational.
Proof (Hofstadter equilibrium ⊂ individual rationality)
Let −→σ be a Hofstadter equilibrium. We can write it as −→σ = (σ, σ, ..., σ) for
some σ ∈ Υ . Let i denote a player.
By definition of a Hofstadter equilibrium, the payoffs are maximal on the
diagonal, so that:
ui(σ, σ, ..., σ) ≥ max
υ∈Υ
ui(υ, υ, ..., υ)
Furthermore, for any strategy υ,
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Fig. 21 A diagram depicting the relationship between the Translucent Equilibrium, Mini-
max Rationalizability, Individual Rationality and the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for
strategy profiles on non-symmetric games: one of the inclusions does not hold in general.
ui(υ, υ, ..., υ) ≥ min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(υ, τ−i)
(the minimum payoff on its line can only be smaller than the payoff on the
diagonal).
Combining the above inequalities:
ui(σ, σ, ..., σ) ≥ max
υ∈Υ
ui(υ, υ, ..., υ) ≥ max
υ∈Υ
min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(υ, τ−i)
Considering that υ is a mute variable and that Υ = Σi (symmetric game),
ui(σ, σ, ..., σ) ≥ max
τi∈Σi
min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(τi, τ−i)
this fulfils the definition of an individually rational outcome. 
9 Counterexamples
We now come back to games that are potentially asymmetric. We already know
that the PTE is always individually rational by definition, and we can also es-
tablish that some other inclusions are not true in general with a few counterex-
amples. The general inclusion diagramm of the PTE, minimax-rationalizability
and individual rationality is shown on Figure 21.
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A B
C 0, 0 3, 1
D 1, 3 2,2
⇒
A B
C 0, 0 3, 1
D 1, 3 2,2
⇒
A B
C 0, 0 3, 1
D 1, 3 2,2
Fig. 22 Iterated elimination of preempted strategy profiles in the the chicken game. The
tuples of maximin utilities are (1,1), then (3,3). No strategy profile remains: there is no
PTE.
9.1 Game with no PTE
The PTE does not always exist, and the Chicken game provides a counter-
example.
Figure 22 gives the detail of the reasoning on a the chicken game.
In the first round, the maximin utilities are (1,1). Strategy profile AC is
both preempted by B and by D.
In the second round, the new maximin utilities are (3,3). None of the
remaining strategy profiles Pareto-dominates (3,3), so that none of them is
stable: no matter which of the remaining outcomes would actually happen,
at least one agent would not have acted rationally under the assumptions of
Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies.
The chicken game thus has no PTE.
Another example of game with no PTE is the Battle of the Sexes game31.
Even though there is no PTE for all games, our framework is not silent
on these games: it does say that there exists no equilibrium under its under-
lying assumptions. This is an improvement over the original superrationality
paradigm, which remains completely silent on symmetric games because it
relies on the symmetry argument.
9.2 Symmetric game with a Hofstadter equilibrium which is not a PTE
The game shown on Figure 22 shows a Hofstadter equilibrium (2, 2) that is not
a PTE: it is not immune to Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of
Strategies, because the row player would have rationally preferred C (getting
3 > 2 knowing that CA is impossible) to B, and likewise the column player
would have rationally preferred B to D knowing that AC is impossible.
This proves that Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strate-
gies is a slightly more stringent assumption than Superrationality.
9.3 Game with a PTE that is not rationalizable
Figure 10 shows a counterexample in which the PTE is not rationalizable.
Indeed, strategy F is a dominant strategy, i.e., it always the best response of
the row player. However, the PTE is (D, A).
31 we refer to its variant in general position
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This is due to rationalizability being specific to the Nash paradigm, in
which deviations are unilateral only.
9.4 Game with a PTE that is not a Nash equilibrium
Figure 10 shows a counterexample in which the PTE is not a Nash equilibrium.
The prisoner’s dilemma is also such a game.
For some other games, the PTE is a Nash equilibrium – for example, a game
where both players always get the same payoffs and have aligned interests. The
non-Nashian paradigm in general is thus in no particular inclusion relationship
with Nash equilibria.
9.5 Game with a PTE that is not minimax-rationalizable
While minimax-rationalizability is a non-Nashian concept, and while the PTE
on symmetric games is always minimax-rationalizable as shown in Section 8,
the PTE is not always minimax-rationalizable in general, showing a singularity
between translucency and full transparency.
10 Conclusion
We introduced a new equilibrium for games in normal form in general positions
reached under Necessary Rationality and Necessary Knowledge of Strategies:
the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. We also precisely singled out the under-
lying counterfactual reasoning as being a decision theory, common to several
non-Nashian results (Hofstadter, Dupuy, Halpern, us) that is neither CDT nor
EDT: Non-Nashian Decision Theory.
In the case of symmetric games, we established inclusion relationships be-
tween the Hofstadter equilibrium Superrational thinkers, the Perfectly Trans-
parent Equilibrium, minimax-rationalizability and individual rationality. As
mentioned in (Fourny et al, 2018), we suspected that the PPE was some kind
of counterpart of the superrational thinking on games in extensive forms, and
the PTE that we have just defined acts here as a missing link between the
two.
The non-Nashian assumptions behind the PTE correspond to one-boxer
behavior in Newcomb’s Paradox, as Dupuy (1992) showed. These assumptions
describe an alternate form of rationality that explains the behavior of some
agents that do not follow Nashian predictions. This form of rationality is based
on on the belief that decisions are correctly predicted in all possible worlds,
and that agents are rational in all possible worlds.
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